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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of these
consolidated appeals pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)(j) (1953), as amended, pertaining to final orders of
any court of record over which the Utah Court of Appeals does not
have original appellate jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
The issues on appeal and applicable standards of review are:
Issue 1:

Whether an unambiguous and comprehensive written

release of all claims, known and unknown, voluntarily and
knowingly agreed to with assistance of counsel, is enforceable as
a matter of law to bar all claims for Defendants' prior conduct.
Standard of Review:

The interpretation of a contract and

its application to the parties, as determined by the words of the
agreement, is a question of law.

50 W. Broadway Assoc, v. The

Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah
1989).

The trial court's legal determinations are allowed no

deference and are reviewed for correctness.

Eskelson v. Town of

Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 771 (Utah 1991); Frontier Foundations v.
Layton Construction, 818 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah App. 1991)
Issue 2:

Whether the failure of Defendants, during

partnership buyout negotiations, to disclose prior conduct which
the Plaintiffs now claim was fraudulent, voids the specific
release of both "known and unknown" claims.

-1-
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Standard of Review;

The issue of whether a release

agreement that releases all possible claims is void because of a

<

claimed failure to disclose prior conduct is an interpretation of
law.

This Court will not defer to the trial court's

interpretation of the release or to the application of the law to
the facts of this case.

I

Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Division,

Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 585-6, 589 (Utah 1991).
Issue 3;

Whether Plaintiffs were entitled to refer to or

<

submit evidence regarding Defendants1 financial condition during
the jury trial before any finding was made that Defendants were
liable, in total disregard of Defendants1 right to a fair trial

'

and Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1(2) (Supp. 1992).
Standard of Review:

This Court will review the trial

court's refusal to apply §78-18-1(2) as a "correction of error,"
disregarding the trial court's interpretation of the statute.
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991).

Also, no

deference is accorded the trial court's determinations regarding
the admissibility of evidence.

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,

781-2, n.3 (Utah 1991) .
Issue 4:

Whether the award of $1.8 million in punitive

damages is excessive and/or influenced by passion or prejudice.
Standard of Review:

Under Crookston v. Fire Insurance

Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (1991), the trial judges' responsibility
is to review the punitive damage award and its amount, and to
insure that the jury has acted within its proper bounds.

This

Court will reverse the trial court's refusal to grant Defendants'
-2-
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'

motion under Rule 59(a), U.R.Civ.P., only for an abuse of
discretion.

817 P.2d at 805-6.

The trial court has abused or

"exceeded" its "discretion" when its finding is "clearly
erroneous," or it acts "unreasonably" or misapplies the law.
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App.
1991); Cf^ Crookston, 817 P.2d at 805, n.20.
Issue 5:

a.

Were Defendants denied a fair trial because

of the cumulative effect of the numerous erroneous evidentiary
and other rulings, and the prejudicial comments by the trial
court?
b.

Were the jury's findings a result of its bias,

prejudice, and/or confusion indicating a lack of understanding as
to what it was supposed to do, necessitating a new trial?
Standard of Review:
trial is an issue of law.

Whether Defendants were denied a fair
Whether the jury's verdict is a result

of passion, prejudice and/or confusion is an issue of law and the
appellate court will give no deference to the trial court and
will review its rulings for correctness.

Eskelson v. Town of

Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 771 (Utah 1991); Tolman v. Salt Lake County
Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27-8 (Utah App. 1991).
Issue 6:

Were Plaintiffs entitled, under U.R.Civ.P. 54(b),

to an award of costs that included the cost of every deposition
of every person deposed during discovery and witness fees in
excess of the statutory rate?
Standard of Review;

The appellate court will review the

trial court's cost award under Rule 54(b) for "abuse of
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

discretion."

Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-4 (Utah

1980); Nielson v. Nielson, 818 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah App, 1991).
An award outside the limits and bounds set by this Court and the
rule will be reviewed under a correction of error standard.

No

deference is accorded the trial court's legal determination.
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 27-8 (Utah App.
1991).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1(2) is determinative of Appellantfs
argument, Point IIB herein on punitive damages.

The statute is

attached as Addendum M L" to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendants refer herein to the Record on appeal as follows:
References to the Court's file and to the transcript of
proceedings include the volume and the page number as
paginated by the clerk for this appeal
Pleadings and District Court File as "R. [Vol.]:[Page]"
Transcript of Proceedings as "Tr. [Vol.]:[Page]"
Trial Exhibits as "Exh. [#]"
Addendum attached to brief as "Add. [#]"
The "Appendix" is a separately bound volume containing
various trial exhibits. Exhibits reproduced in the Appendix
are also designated with "App."
The Complaint was filed on July 26, 1990.

(R. 1:2-18)
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It

alleged claims for fraud, constructive fraud and negligent
misrepresentation based primarily on alleged misrepresentations
as to the composition of individual crypts in the outdoor garden
pavilions of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum.

The Complaint

sought rescission of a Partnership Agreement and a later
Redemption Agreement by which Defendants1 interest in the
partnership was acquired by Plaintiffs.

Alternatively,

Plaintiffs sought damages of $2.5 million.

The Complaint also

alleged that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty by their
alleged misrepresentations and by failing to disclose material
facts concerning the outdoor garden crypts.

The Complaint also

alleged that Defendants had wrongfully converted several crypts.
There was no claim that the financial condition or history of any
mausoleum property was misrepresented.

(Tr. 111:3221-22)

Defendants answered, denying all allegations of wrongdoing.
(R. 1:34-46) Among other affirmative defenses, Defendants
alleged that the release provisions of the Redemption Agreement
(Exh. 31 - App.) barred all the claims of the Complaint.
After considerable discovery, Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment based on Plaintiffs1 release of all their claims
against Defendants under the terms of the Redemption Agreement.
(R. 1:267-369)

The trial court denied the motion on the ground

that "there are sufficient issues of fact bearing upon the
conduct of the parties incident to the execution of the
dissolution and release agreement [the Redemption Agreement,
Exh. 31] . . ."

(Tr. Apr. 8, 1991:2859)
-5-
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The case was tried to a jury in a 10-day trial in August
1991.

The parties called 26 witnesses, creating almost 2,000

pages of trial transcript.
trial.

(R. 5:1770-91)

Over 100 exhibits were received at

On Monday morning, August 26, 1991, the

jury returned a verdict after only 2-1/2 hours of total
deliberations.

<

(R. 4:1414-15)

<

The special verdict form

contained 14 questions to be answered by the jurors, including
the amount of any compensation to which Plaintiffs might be

<

entitled under their rescission theory, as well as actual damages
under their alternative claim for damages.
Add. "F")

(R. 5:1872-76 -

The jury found in favor of Plaintiffs on their claims

of fraud and negligent misrepresentations, but found no
constructive fraud.
The jury found the damages under Plaintiffs' fraud theory to
be $447,034.00.

The jury also found that Plaintiffs were

entitled under their rescission theory to "consequential damages"
of $1,165,022.00 in addition to the $1,240,220.00 Plaintiffs had
invested initially in the partnership and under the Redemption
Agreement.

The jury also assessed punitive damages of $1.8

million against Defendants.
The jury further found that Plaintiffs were entitled to
$70,000.00 for breach of Defendants1 fiduciary duties and an
additional $512,098.00 for Defendant Garner's conversion of
assets.

(R. 5:1872-76; Tr. XI:4826-37)

The trial court entered its Judgment on September 26, 1991,
incorporating therein the entire special verdict of the jury.
-6-
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'

The Judgment rescinded the Partnership and the Redemption
Agreements for fraud and negligent misrepresentation and awarded
Plaintiffs $2,405,242.00 in restitution and $1.8 million in
punitive damages.

(R. 5:1923-36 - Add. M F M )

Defendants1 timely motions for judgment N.O.V. or for new
trial, and for remittitur of punitive damages, were denied by the
trial court on November 13, 1991.

(R. 5:1920-22; 6:2532-38 -

Add. "G")
On October 8, 1991, on Plaintiffs1 motion, the court entered
a supplemental judgment against Defendants in the amount of
$29,648.00 for Plaintiffs' interim operating costs between the
time of trial and the date of judgment.

(R. 6:2165-67 - Add.

"H")
Defendants filed their notice of appeal on November 14,
1991, appealing from both judgments.

(R. 7:2690-92)

An amended

notice of appeal was filed December 4, 1991, merely correcting
the date of the supplemental judgment.

(R. 7:2810-12)

Meanwhile, following a hearing before this Court on
November 20, 1991, the parties worked out a stipulation for an
interim and permanent supersedeas bond pending appeal.
(R. 7:2758-2809)
Plaintiffs filed a verified memorandum of costs on
October 3, 1991.

(R. 5:2073-84 - Add. "I")

and moved to tax costs.

Defendants objected

(R. 6:2265-2302 - Add. "J")

The trial

court taxed costs by a Minute Entry ruling on December 23, 1991.
(R. 7:2854)

A judgment for costs was entered January 2, 1992,
-7-
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awarding Plaintiffs $11,503.60 for deposition fees, witness fees
of $631.75, and the filing fee of $125.00, a total of $12,260.35.
(R. 7:6495-96 - Add. "K")
Defendants appealed from that judgment on January 24, 1992.
(R. 7:6511-12)
No. 920066.

That appeal was docketed in this Court as Appeal

(R. 7:6524)

.

Thereafter, this Court consolidated the

various appeals taken by Defendants in this case under Appellate
Case No. 910522.

,
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Plaintiffs
Plaintiff David L. Alldredge graduated from Brigham Young

University in 1969 in Asian Studies and Political Science and
then obtained an M.B.A. at Harvard University in 1971.
(Tr. 1:2935-36) Alldredge then spent over 14 years as a
commercial banking officer with the First National Bank of
Chicago developing business for the bank.

(Tr. 1:2936-37)

Alldredge was General Manager of the bank's Singapore Branch,
residing there.

He was later promoted to be the bank's area head

for North Asia and resided in Hong Kong.

(Tr. 1:2938)

One of the routine responsibilities Alldredge had was to
bring potential investments to the attention of his clients, and
the Ong family was one of his best clients.
11:2974)

(Tr. I:2943A;

At one time, he had authority to authorize bank loans

as high as $20 million.

(Tr. 11:3119)

In 1985, Alldredge joined the International Bank of Asia in
Hong Kong and was appointed its General Manager for the Hong Kong
area.

He directly supervised about 40 employees in the business

development division, but was also responsible for all 700 bank
employees in his area.

(Tr. 1:2938-9)

Plaintiff D & D Management is a Utah corporation organized
and owned entirely by Alldredge individually.
Mr. Ong Ka Thai was raised in Singapore.

(Tr. 111:3237)
He received a

college education in California, graduating from UCLA in 1974.
(Tr. V:3796-7)

Mr. Ong described his professional occupation as
-9-
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"businessman and a company director."

(Tr. V:3797)

Mr. Ong is

the Executive Director of Ong Holding Co., which is a publicly-

I

held investment company based in Hong Kong and listed on the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange.

(Tr. V:3798-99)

Mr. Ong became acquainted

with Plaintiff Alldredge in the late 1970's when Alldredge was a

<

banker for the various Ong family businesses and Mr. Ong worked
in "financial services" for his family company in Singapore and
Jakarta.

(Tr. V:3799-800)

<

Plaintiff Ong International (U.S.A.), Inc., a Nevada
corporation, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Ong Holding
(

Company and was formed in 1987 to invest in United States'
business.

Both Mr. Ong and Mr. Alldredge have served as the

President of Ong International and Mr. Ong is now its Chairman of
the Board.

B.

(Tr. VI:3880-81; V-.3798)

'

The Defendants
Defendant Keith E. Garner is a Utah resident who has

developed commercial, residential and industrial properties since
1956.

(Tr. V:3644-47)

He is the principal shareholder of

Defendant 11th Avenue Corporation, a Utah corporation.
V:3645; Tr. 111:3235)

(Tr.

11th Avenue Corporation owned the Salt

Lake Memorial Mausoleum located on the Salt Lake City north bench
above the City cemetery.

(R: 1:0003-4; Exh. 1)

his stock in the corporation in about 1979.

Garner purchased

(Tr. V:3649)

11th

Avenue Corporation was originally known as "Salt Lake Memorial
Mausoleum," but changed its name to "SLMM" when the parties
-10-
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formed their partnership herein,
R. 1:0003)

(Tr. V:3645; 11:3016;

The corporation again changed its name to 11th Avenue

Corporation after the 1989 Redemption Agreement by which
Plaintiffs acquired total ownership of the partnership, which
then owned the Mausoleum.

(Tr. IX:4582; R. 1:0003; Exh. 31)

Defendant Garner supervised and controlled the operation of
the Mausoleum facility from 1979 until the partnership in 1988,
when David Alldredge came to Salt Lake to manage the facility in
July.

C.

(Tr. V:3649-51)

The Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum
The Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum ("Mausoleum") is in the

business of providing facilities for the above ground interment
of the dead.

(Exhs. 12, 13, 16 - App.)

The Mausoleum consists

of a large main building of indoor burial compartments called
crypts, five outdoor garden pavilions to the east (Exhs. 6-8, 110
- App.), and a smaller office building to the west.

The property

also includes four building lots known as the Skyway Heights
lots.

(Exh. 1 - App.)
The indoor, or main, mausoleum building was constructed in

the late 1920's.

The crypts therein were constructed of

concrete, with pipes providing ventilation to the outside.
(Tr. 1:2958-59; 11:2997)

Construction of the main mausoleum and

its crypts is not at issue.
From 1984 through 1987, Defendants constructed five outdoor

-11-
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(Exh. 51 - App.) 1

garden pavilions adjoining each other.

As

shown in the pavilion footprint, each outdoor pavilion structure
contains 102 crypts.

,

(Exh. 110 - App.)

At the entrance to each outdoor pavilion is a wrought iron
gate in the south side, which opens to an inner patio flanked on
the remaining three sides by the crypts.
with marble.

(See Exhs. 7, 8 - App.)

<

Each crypt is faced

The outer walls, ceiling

and floor of each pavilion are of reinforced concrete, and each
pavilion is roofed with Bartile shingles.

I

(Exhs. 253 - App.)

The roof overhangs the entrance and sides of each pavilion by
several feet.

(Exh. 6 - App.)

Plaintiffs did not dispute the

i

structural integrity and adequacy of the pavilion shell
structures at trial.

(Tr. VII:4271)

The interlocking crypt compartments in the three center

<

pavilions (see Exh. 110) are constructed of wood, except where
they abut the outer concrete walls of the pavilion and where the
marble facings appear.

(This method of construction is

illustrated in Exhs. 255, 259, 11, 16 - App.)

The crypts of the

other two remaining pavilions are made of a combination of wood
and concrete or all concrete.

(Exhs. 12, 13 - App.)

These garden pavilion crypts are vented by holes beginning
in the ceiling of the lowest crypt, to the floor of the one above
and on into the attic above each bank of crypts.
App.)

(Exh. 19 -

Ventilation is provided from the attic to the outside. The
1

Photograph exhibits and architectural drawings of the
pavilion shells (Exhs. 1, 6-8, 11, 49-50) are all contained in
the separate Appendix.
-12-
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'

outdoor crypts do not have a drainage system to handle any fluid
drainage that might occur from a body in a casket.

(Tr. IV:3472)

However/ Plaintiffs' expert said there might be fluid drainage
only once in every several hundred entombments.

(Tr. IV:3618)

When a body is entombed, the marble facing of the crypt is
removed and the burial casket is inserted into the crypt space.
For higher crypts, the casket is first lifted onto scaffolding at
the appropriate level to facilitate the entombment.
App.)

(Exh. 260 -

The open front of the crypt is then sealed with a thick

plate of plexiglass and the marble facing is placed back on.
(Exh. 21 - App.)
The outer concrete shells of the pavilions were constructed
in 1984 and 1985.

The crypt compartments were built during late

1985 and early 1986.

(Exh. 51 - App.; Tr. VIII:4445)

In the

fall of 1986, marble facings were placed over the openings of a
majority of the outdoor garden pavilion crypts, but 12 to 18
crypts in each pavilion remained open and unfaced until October
of 1987.

(Tr. VIII:4445-46; Exh. 11 - App.)

During these two

years, each open crypt was exposed to public view.

The wooden

framework construction was readily apparent to anyone in the near
vicinity, even from as far away as the roadway of 11th Avenue.
(Tr. VIII:4387, 4454-56; Exh. 11 - App.)

D.

Acquaintance of the Parties
Defendant Garner and Plaintiff Alldredge first became

acquainted in 1965 in Hong Kong, where Plaintiff Alldredge was an
-13-
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L.D.S. missionary when Mr. Garner arrived as the new president of
that mission.

(Tr. 1:2928-30)

Plaintiff Alldredge left Hong

Kong in 1965, and the two had no further communication or
association until 20 years later, in November 1986, when they met
by chance at a B.Y.U. football game in Provo, Utah.
2940)

(Tr. 1:2935,

Mr. Alldredge was then living in Hong Kong, where he was

the Manager of the Asian Bank.

(Tr. 1:2938, 2943A)

That encounter led to discussions between Defendant Garner
and Plaintiff Alldredge concerning possible joint ventures
between Mr. Garner and Mr. Alldredge's client, Mr. Ong, or
entities with which they were associated.

(Tr. 1:2940, 2943,

2947, 2952; V:3803)

E.

Inspections of the Mausoleum
In April 1987, while in Salt Lake City negotiating another

joint venture, Alldredge and Ong received a tour of the Mausoleum
from Mr. Garner.

(Tr. VIII:4321-2, V:3675, 1:2954) Garner

showed Alldredge and Ong the indoor mausoleum building, including
a "model" crypt therein faced with a glass front and made of
concrete.

(Tr. 1:2958-59)

Unlike all the other crypts, however,

that indoor "model" crypt is lighted inside and is plastered and
painted.

(Tr. VIII:4328-29, V:3676, VIII:4364)

Alldredge

claimed that when he was shown this "model" crypt he was told
that it was "representative" of all of the crypts throughout the
mausoleum property.

(Tr. 11:2971)

-14-
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Alldredge testified that they then walked outside and were
shown the outdoor pavilions from the sidewalk that runs in front
of them, but that he was close to the curb of the driveway and
does not recall just how far down the sidewalk he went.
(Tr. 11:3142)

Alldredge testified that Garner told them that the

outdoor crypts in the pavilions were built to the same "high
quality" as the indoor mausoleum.

(Tr. 11:2971)

Mr. Alldredge's testimony was not corroborated by Mr. Ong,
who did not recall visiting the Mausoleum on that occasion.
(Tr. V:3805-06)
In his testimony, Mr. Garner described how he took both
Mr. Ong and Mr. Alldredge around the Mausoleum in April 1987.
They visited the indoor mausoleum and Mr. Garner testified that
he showed them the "model" crypt to illustrate just what a crypt
is.

(Tr. VIII:4322)
Exiting the main building, Ong and Alldredge then walked

outside to the front of the five outdoor pavilions.

Mr. Garner

testified that he told them that he had designed the outer shell
of the pavilions with reinforced concrete and steel so as to make
it appropriate to use wood inside for the crypts and that the
first outdoor crypts were built of concrete but the rest were of
wood or concrete and wood.

(Tr. VIII:4323-4)

Mr. Garner further testified that in July 1987, he again
took Mr. Alldredge on a tour of the Mausoleum.
4327-31)

(Tr. VIII:4325,

After lunch that day with Dr. Burtis Evans, Garner's

friend, the three returned to the Mausoleum where they again
-15-
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viewed the outdoor pavilions.

(Tr. VIII:4333-34)

Dr. Evans

testified that they saw the interior of the crypts with 2x4's and

-

plywood visible where marble facing had not yet been installed.
(Tr. IX:4653-55)

Alldredge specifically commented "that the wood

proposition in the crypts was an interesting innovation."
(Tr. IX:4652f 4655, 4680)

^

Dr. Evans also recalled that Alldredge

called Mr. Garner an "innovator" for his design of the pavilions.
(Tr. IX:4655, 4680)

<

Susan Stewart, 11th Avenue's Corporate Secretary, was
present in Mr. Garner's office in July 1987 when Mr. Garner
showed Mr. Alldredge a model of the outdoor pavilions and told
him about the properties of the wood used.

(

(Tr. IX:4592, 4639)

Mr. Alldredge admitted that he may have visited Mr. Garner
in his mausoleum office in July of 1987, but claimed that he did
not see any other areas of the premises.

<

(Tr. 11:2983, 3153-56)

He also testified that it was "possible" he visited with
Dr. Burtis Evans at the Mausoleum, but he could not recall it.
Alldredge did recall a lunch with Dr. Evans and Mr. Garner, but
claimed that was in 1988.

(Tr. 11:3157-59)

Until October of 1987, 84 of the outdoor crypts had no
marble facing covering their front and they were open to public
view.

Forty-eight of those eighty-four crypts (18 in each of the

3 middle pavilions), were made entirely of wood.

(Tr. VIII:4446;

IX:4595)
Mr. Alldredge claimed that the parties did not discuss
Plaintiffs investing in the mausoleum property until November
-16-
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(

1987.

(Tr. 11:2984)

However, he also testified that from that

time forward all financial and other information about the
Mausoleum which Plaintiffs requested from Defendants was
provided.

(Tr. 11:3187; 111:3215, 3224)

Such information

included the number of outdoor crypts that had been sold; the
number of burial spaces, both indoor and outdoor, available for
sale; and the fact that there had been a financial loss from
operation of several hundred thousand dollars for several years
preceding the negotiations.

(Tr. 11:3168)

Unknown to Defendants, Alldredge prepared a financial
analysis of the Mausoleum and also commissioned an independent
survey and analysis of the business, and furnished both to the
Ong family for its review.

(Tr. 11:3006; Exh. 139, 140 - App.)

Mr. Alldredge testified that he met with Mr. Garner at the
Mausoleum in December 1987 and received Ma much more detailed
tour."

(Tr. 11:2993)

He stated that Mr. Garner gave more detail

on the construction of the indoor mausoleum and pointed out a
valve in the model crypt used for ventilation and drainage.
11:2996)

(Tr.

Mr. Alldredge claims that Mr. Garner told him that all

of the crypts on the mausoleum property were concrete,
waterproof, and fireproof.

(Tr. 11:2997-98)

Mr. Garner denied that he gave such a "tour" of the
Mausoleum to Mr. Alldredge in December 1987, but agreed that he
did talk with Alldredge about the Mausoleum.

(Tr. VIII:4339)

Susan Stewart testified that in December 1987 she overheard
Alldredge and Garner in Garner's office discuss Mausoleum
-17-
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finances, but never heard any discussion regarding crypt
construction.

(Tr. IX:4597-8)

During the first week of April 1988, Alldredge and Ong, with
Mrs. Ong, received a tour of the mausoleum property with Mr.
Garner.

Mr. Alldredge claimed that Mr. Garner then made the

^

"same" representations concerning the construction of the outdoor
crypts that had been made to Alldredge previously.

(Tr. 11:3024;

111:3325)

(

Mr. Garner recalled having "toured" the mausoleum property
with Mr. Alldredge and Mr. and Mrs. Ong in April 1988, but said
that he did not discuss with them the construction of the outdoor

(

crypts or the materials used therein in April 1988 when they
visited the property.

(Tr. VIII:4340-41; V:3675)

Mrs. Ong did

not testify.

F.

<

The Partnership
Mr. Garner visited the Plaintiffs in Hong Kong in March

1988. There, the parties reached a preliminary agreement for Ong
to acquire a 50% stock interest in the Mausoleum, including the
outdoor garden pavilions and other adjoining premises.

(Tr.

11:3104; 111:3229; VI:3875-76; Exh. Ill)
The parties finally agreed to a partnership and executed a
Partnership Agreement dated May 13, 1988.

(Exh. 28 - App.)

Plaintiffs Ong International, D&D Management, and Salt Lake
Memorial Mausoleum (the corporation, now 11th Avenue Corporation)
became the partners.

The mausoleum corporation, contributed the
-18-
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property and business.
$800,000.00.

Plaintiff Ong International contributed

Alldredge received a 12% interest, even though he

contributed nothing but his experience.

(Tr. VI:3878-9; 11:3014;

111:3232)
Plaintiff Alldredge returned to Utah from Asia in June 1988
as the manager of the Mausoleum and took an office in the indoor
mausoleum building in July 1988.

(Tr. 11:3032; 111:3247-48)

Once in the fall of 1988, Plaintiff Alldredge assisted, at
the request of Defendants, in entombing a casket in a wood crypt
in an outdoor pavilion.

Specifically, Mr. Alldredge helped lift

the casket onto scaffolding in front of the crypt which was open
to his view.

Alldredge admitted that no one prevented him from

seeing the crypt, but claimed that he did not see or even look at
the crypt at that time.

(Tr. VIII:4344-46; 111:3287-92)

Soon after Mr. Alldredge began officing at the Mausoleum in
July 1988, various disputes arose between the parties.
(Tr. 11:3035-41; 111:3252-55; VIII:4470)

Alldredge claimed that

Garner refused to relinquish control and management of the
business.

(Tr. 11:3035)

The friction between Alldredge and Garner over their
relationship increased until, by November of 1988, Plaintiffs
"had lost all trust" in Defendant Garner. (Tr. 111:3252-54;
VI:3880; V:3826)
During the time that 11th Avenue was in partnership with
Plaintiffs, from May 1988 through February 1989, Mr. Garner did
not make any statement to Mr. Alldredge or to Mr. Ong concerning
-19-
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the construction, design, or composition of the crypts in the
outdoor pavilions.

G.

(Tr. 11:3050-51; 111:3276)

The Redemption Agreement and Release
Because Plaintiffs had "lost all trust" in Garner, the

parties discussed and finally agreed to terminate their
relationship as partners.

(Tr. 11:3049; 111:3271-73, 3276-79)

In their final negotiations, Ong's interests were represented by
their attorney, Edward Djang of California.

(Tr. V:3839)

Defendants were represented by a Salt Lake attorney, James
Richards.

(Tr. VIII:4475; 111:3277)

In March 1989, the parties each signed the Redemption
Agreement dated February 28, 1989 (Exh. 31 - App.), pursuant to
which Ong agreed to pay an additional $440,220.00 over a period
of time to 11th Avenue Corporation to redeem the latter1s
interest in the Mausoleum partnership.

(Exh. 31, Tr. 11:3054-5)

In the Redemption Agreement (Exh. 31), the Plaintiffs each
released Defendants from any and all claims, known or unknown, a
follows:
13.2 Release by the Partnership. Except as
otherwise provided in this Agreement, the Partnership,
its partners, their respective agents, officers,
employees, successors, assigns and heirs, and each of
them, forever discharge SLMM its agents, officers and
employees from any and all claims, demands, rights of
action or causes of action, whether known or unknown,
howsoever arising, which in any way are based upon or
related to SLMM's association with the Partnership.
This "release" and "discharge" language was drafted by Ong's
attorney and was inserted by him in the Agreement.
-20-
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H.

Plaintiffs' Operation of the Mausoleum
Over one year later, by June 1990, Plaintiffs had stopped

selling outdoor crypts.

(Tr. 11:3096)

^

After the March 1989

Redemption Agreement and through June of 1990, Plaintiffs
operated the Mausoleum business at an operating loss of
$219,000.00.

(Tr. IX:4518)

^

During this period, Alldredge's

personal corporation, D&D Management, was paid over $11,500.00 a
month out of the Mausoleum for management.

(Tr. 11:3017-18)

<

Plaintiffs sold not more than three outdoor crypts during this
period.

Plaintiffs' loss was 212% of their sales.

(Exh. 247;

Tr. IX:4517-19, 4572)

I.

(

Plaintiffs' Claimed Discovery of Wood Crypts
In July of 1989, Plaintiff Alldredge was told by his

<

secretary, Jeri Stevens, that she was informed that there was or
might be wood in the crypts of the outdoor garden pavilions.
(Tr. 11:3062-63)

He commented to her that "the Mausoleum deal

has been concluded" and he did not want to be bothered with it.
(Tr. 111:3308)

At that time, Mr. Alldredge was in the middle of

addressing another dispute with Mr. Garner and took no action to
verify this information from Mrs. Stevens.

(Tr. 111:3305-08)

In April of 1990, when Plaintiff Alldredge decided to
"catalog" all of the grievances he harbored against Mr. Garner,
he suddenly "remembered" what his secretary had told him the year
before and decided to check it out.

-22-
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she owns substantial assets and has substantial income in her own
right, which appeared on the exhibits received in evidence.

^

(Id.)
The trial court allowed witnesses to describe sales
presentations made to crypt purchasers years before the

<

representations that Plaintiffs claim were made in 1987 and 1988.
(Tr. VI:3915, 4014)
At trial, Plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to
damages, as well as rescission.

(

No adequate election of remedies

was ever made, except in the judgment itself.

(R. 3:1208-11,
i

1288-99, 1398; Tr. VI:3958-9)
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i

his assets prior to a finding that Defendants were liable,
(§78-18-1(2) (Supp. 1992).

Nor did the trial court follow the

(

guidelines set forth by this Court in Crookston v. Fire Ins,
Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (1991), which was decided before the trial
in this case and which had been tried before the same judge.

{

By its rulings and its comments during the course of the
trial, the lower court created an atmosphere which had the effect
of confusing the jury and engendering passion and prejudice which
prevented Defendants from having a fair trial.

\

This was evident

from the special verdict returned by the jury on the issue of
punitive damages, as well as the issue relating to conversion of
assets; among others.

i

The treatment of the court of the issue

relating to the election of remedies and submitting the issue of
damages for fraud to the jury further added to the jury's
confusion.
Finally, the court failed to follow the law in respect to
awarding costs to Plaintiffs, if indeed the Plaintiffs were
entitled to costs, and awarded Plaintiffs all costs incurred in
connection with all depositions taken by either party.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENFORCE THE
UNAMBIGUOUS RELEASE LANGUAGE OF THE REDEMPTION AGREEMENT
THAT BARS ALI. OF PLAINTIFFS 1 CLAIMS
A.

The Release Language of the Redemption Agreement is C l e a r y
Unambiguous, and Comprehensive, and Barred all of
p
l a i n t i f f s ' Claims, "Known and Unknown."
After oper * •

•

^--tnership with Defendants for

severdj. ULUUL
longe*" ror f : >.,* ±

Defendants1 partners.

n e g o t i a t e d t h e terms

"Redemption

v

r •«-••

-,:• t- «

•.-, •.-

, •

.5

Aft-

t pa

.f

^ ie^~ r^ 2 1 ^

s

n ^ f . ^ i J ij.. r r!

.::

-

1 •j 1 i e e 11 e d D e f E; I 1 d a 1: 11 s ,! p a 1: t: 1 1 e :i : s 1: 1 i j: • i 1: :i t e 1: e s t .
The Redemption Agreement included a specific, u n a m b i g u o u s ,
,v. • comprehensi •

- pd:--

- language :)l: which -%,:-, *• : r , ied
> ' . ,

Agreement, , ; vi.je

* • ji

. ,3 * :r.-

.aragraph

. * .he

elease and discharge

. SLMK
„s a g e n t s , otticers, and employees [e.g.
Mr. Garner, irom any and all claims, d e m a n d s , rights of
action or causes of action, whether known or unknown,
howsoever arising, which in any way are based upon or
related to SLMM's association with the Partnership.
(Emphasis added )
( Exh.

:.. , pp

9™ . 0 ,

r'aragrapn 1 /. 2 of the Redempt Io 1: 1 Agreement a 1 s*
ai 1 "enti reties clause" that provides, i 11 relevant parti
This Agreement is one of a series of agreements that
constitute one integrated transaction between the
p a 1: t :i e s t h e r e t o per t a I n I n g t o t h e subject matte r h e r e o f
and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous agreements
and understandings of the parties. There are no
-27-
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{

It would be difficult to imagine release language more
encompassing or comprehensive than this.
language is clear.

The agreement's release

It is not in any way ambiguous under any

reasonable construction.

The trial court's interpretation and

failure to enforce these terms is accorded no deference on
appeal.

^

(

An appellate court will read the language for itself and

then will construe and apply the unambiguous and all-encompassing
release provision according to its plain and simple language.

<

Winet v. Price, Slip. Op. 3-4, 1992 W.L. 55288 (Cal.App. Mar. 23,
1992); accord Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979)
(Interpreting the language of a conveyance of mineral rights);

<

Palmer v. Davis, 808 P.2d 128, 132 (Utah App. 1991).
The release language clearly encompasses all four factual
claims of the Complaint, to wit:

(1) alleged misrepresentation

{

as to the manner of construction of the outdoor pavilion crypts;
(2) the alleged failure of the pavilion construction to comply
with applicable building codes and ordinances; (3) payment of
real property taxes; and (4) the alleged conversion of
partnership property by reservation of various crypts in the
indoor mausoleum building.

(R. 1:7-16) These matters were

clearly "based on or related to SLMM's association with the
Partnership" because the Mausoleum was the object of the

warranties, representations or other agreements between
the parties in connection with the subject matter
hereof except as described herein. (Exh. 31, p.15)
(Emphasis added.)
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(

agreement and your personal release will be outside and
separate from the agreement. (Emphasis added.)
To excuse Plaintiffs from their release because ". . . w e didn't
know" negates the express language of the Redemption Agreement.
In Winet v. Price, Slip. Op. 1992 W.L. 55288 (Cal.App.
Mar. 23, 1992), the California Court of Appeal affirmed the
enforcement of an agreement "releasing all claims against a
party, including unknown and unsuspected claims" that barred the
plaintiff's claim that the defendant breached his duty as a
general partner.

(Slip. Op. at 1-2)

In enforcing an accord and

satisfaction to bar an unasserted attorney fee claim under a
contract, this Court has stated that "[u]nknown claims and
liability may be extinguished if the parties so intend."

Quealy

v. Anderson, 714 P.2d 667, 669 (Utah 1986). 3
Plaintiffs' self-serving disclaimers at trial that they did
not "intend" to release any claim for past misrepresentations
cannot be countenanced by this Court.

Where the release language

is clear, effect must be given to the intent of the parties as
indicated by the language they employed in the agreement.
v. Curran, 2 N.Y.2d 157, 161, 139 N.E.2d 133, 135-6 (1956).

Lucio
Even

if their unexpressed and uncommunicated "intent" not to release
their present claims were considered credible, "[i]t is the
outward expression of the agreement, rather than a party's
J

See also Kolar v. Ray, 97 111.Dec. 240, 492 N.E.2d 899,
902 (1986) (Court enforced a release of any and all claims,
"known and unknown, foreseen and unforseen"); Paradisco v.
Colonial Townhouses, Inc., 138 Misc.2d 1002, 526 N.Y.S.2d 308,
312-13 (1988) (Plaintiff's claim was embraced by the release
whether specifically known or not).
-30-
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("Full effect must be given to the intent of the parties a s
reflected by the language used by them.)
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Horgan and the other authorities cited herein, his "feeling of
latent discontent" is an insufficient basis upon which to allow
Plaintiffs1 claims.

Horgan, 657 P.2d at 754. The release

provision of the Redemption Agreement is clear and unambiguous.
Its plain language encompasses and bars all of Plaintiffs1
claims.

The release must be enforced and the judgment below

reversed as a matter of law.

B.

Execution of the Redemption Agreement was not Induced by
Fraud.
Plaintiffs scurry to avoid the strong, all-encompassing

release in the Redemption Agreement by arguing that the release
was procured by Defendants' fraud.

Plaintiffs' contentions of

fraud rest solely upon their claims that the construction of the
outdoor garden crypts was misrepresented by Mr. Garner and that
such misrepresentations were so critical and substantial that
they were not affected by the knowing and voluntary release
provisions of the Redemption Agreement.
The evidence was sharply divided as to whether or not the
crypts were misrepresented before the partnership.

However, the

evidence was undisputed that the representations were made in
1987 and 1988, before the parties' partnership and well before
that partnership was terminated when each side released the other
from all liability and responsibility.

The record is entirely

devoid of any evidence that Mr. Garner represented or concealed
the nature of the crypts after the partnership commenced in
May 1988.
-32-
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pavilion construction or that Defendants fraudulently "induced"
the Redemption Agreement.

(

In Ingram Corp. v, J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295
(5th Cir. 1983), plaintiff Ingram agreed to sell its assets in
the marine construction industry to a major competitor,
McDermott.

I

When numerous disputes arose between the parties

concerning Ingram's unfinished construction work, a settlement
agreement was reached in which Ingram agreed to pay McDermott a

{

sum in excess of $1.2 million with an exchange of releases.
Ingram agreed to release McDermott "from all manner of
actions, causes of actions, suits, . . . claims and demands
whatsoever in law, in admiralty, or in equity, . . . including
without limitation of the generality hereof, any past, present or
future claims, matters, causes or things that [Ingram] has or may
hereafter have arising out of, based upon or in any way related
to" the various prior agreements between the parties.

Id.

at 1302, n.ll.
Ingram later sued, claiming that its earlier releases were
vitiated due to McDermott1s fraud.

The trial court refused to

grant McDermott's summary judgment on the plain language of the
encompassing release.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for
judgment against Ingram, concluding that the "unmistakably clear
language" of the releases "negotiated by commercial parties with
substantially equal bargaining power," meant exactly what they

-34-
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venturesi, and, Indeed, :i 1 1 the i nternat i ona 1 operations o£
business.

(Tr. V:3 793,

releasing jere:

3 79 7 99; 1:2936-43; 11:29/4, JX19)
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that

•• - -oo: *,nership misrepresent jt 1 >ns , :r,sr;* ited
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1 1 ,
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( Emphas 15 added. )

Plaint I L L S Ong aiiu r^,ldredq^ 1, *J
^itjuep: ,- r\ or m i srepresentd r. ion .

.:

t>">H II"1, 2d at 1315 ,
"*•-».•.•
defendant

5

S e e also Shelton v. Exxon Corp., 921 F.2d 595, 602 (5th
C i r . 1991) (Claims unknown to the releasor at the time it gave a
release a r e barred when covered by the release l a n g u a g e . ) ; Nat f 1
Union Fire Ins. C o . of Pittsburgh, PA. v. C i r c l e , Inc.,
915 F.2d 986, 989-91 (5th Cir. 1990) (Release of a claim val1led
at over $200,000 w a s not objectively absurd, even if u n w i s e ,
w h e r e the val ne of the released claim w a s both unknown a n d
unknowafa1e at the t i me the re1ease w a s q i ven.}
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(

negotiation and conclusion of the Redemption Agreement and its
release.

The only evidence of misrepresentation by Defendants is

Plaintiffs1 testimony that they were not told of wooden crypts
before the partnership in 1988. Any argument that the
Plaintiffs' release of claims was procured or induced by
Defendants' misrepresentation is wholly premised on that evidence
alone.

Such evidence led only to a partnership agreement and is

far too collateral and removed in time to have affected the
validity of a comprehensive release thereafter knowingly and
voluntarily given, without coercion or duress, and with counsel's
advice.
Plaintiffs would have this Court, as well as the trial court
and jury, believe that to construct a garden pavilion mausoleum
with wooden crypts is inherently fraudulent and deceptive.

At

the time, however, Mr. Alldredge was said to have extolled
Mr. Garner as an "innovator."
4680)

(Tr. VIII:4331; IX:4652, 4655,

There was no building or other code that was violated

merely by constructing the crypts of wood.

(Tr. VIII:4437;

IV:3491-2)

6

Bakamus v. Albert, 1 Wash. 2d 241, 95 P.2d 767, 771 (1939)
(appellant unsuccessfully asserted her ignorance of the claim at
the time she signed the release that barred the claim); Houston
v. Trower, 297 F. 558 (8th Cir. 1924); Barbour v. Poncelor,
203 Ala. 386, 83 So. 130, 132-33 (1919) (recently followed in
Regional Health Services, Inc. v. Hale Co. Hospital Bd., 565 S.2d
109, 113-14 (Ala. 1990).); Accord Pettinelli v. Danzig,
722 F.2d 706, 710 (11th Cir. 1984) ("When negotiating or
attempting to compromise an existing controversy over fraud and
dishonesty it is unreasonable to rely on representations made by
the allegedly dishonest parties.").
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outdoor crypts" construction.

7

Burke v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1982) (A financing
partner did not breach his fiduciary duty to the managing par trier
by failiiig to voluntarily disclose the value of the managing
partner f s partnership interest sold to the financing partner, as
the managing partner had access to information concerning this
value); Utah Code Ann. §48-1-17 (1989) (A partner is obliged to
provide "true and full information of al 1 things affecti ng the
partnersh i n,f t-n anni-hpr oartn^r .,J.M- • demand.)
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(

Defendants further submit that whether the crypts within the
concrete pavilions were made of wood or of reinforced concrete is
immaterial/ as long as they were built structurally sound and in
a reasonable workmanlike manner.

As pointed out in section

III.B.2., below. Defendants were precluded from fully presenting
their expert evidence that such was the case.

Plaintiffs'

evidence utterly fails to establish the legal or factual
materiality of any misrepresentation of wooden crypts.
Plaintiffs1 "expert11 critics were James Milne and Cramer
Stiff.

Mr. Milne, an engineer who had built concrete mausoleums

in other states (but not in Utah), addressed such matters as
whether the recesses for marble facing were aesthetically
desirable or whether the ventilation system might have been
better.

(Tr. IV:3581, 3599-600)

He opined that the crypts

should have a "drainage system/1 although he admitted such a
system was really needed for only one in every several hundred
crypts.

(Tr. IV-.3618)

Mr. Stiff claimed expertise as a "sales consultant."

He did

not believe that the wood crypts could be sold if customers had
been informed that they were wood.

(Tr. VI:3971)

Stiff admitted

that he had no experience selling wooden crypts and had never
tried.

(Tr. VI:4007)

In fact, before he was told that the

outdoor crypts were partially constructed of wood, he
specifically praised the outdoor garden pavilions and their
design.

He considered them aesthetically pleasing and secure.
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:

were constructed there was never any attempt to conceal the
nature of the construction from public view.

And, Plaintiffs

failed to prove that the wood construction of the crypts was ever
a material fact either to Plaintiffs1 investment or to their
release of claims.
" [I]n order to overcome the effect of a release or other
written instrument, the contrary evidence must be clear and
convincing."

Maxfield v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co.,

8 Utah 2d 183, 330 P.2d 1018, 1019 (1958).

Here, there simply

was no evidence that the Redemption Agreement itself was procured
by any fraud, let alone evidence that might be considered to meet
the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.
Plaintiffs wish to bind Defendants to the obligations and to
the benefits which Plaintiffs derived from the Redemption
Agreement.

Yet, Plaintiffs are unwilling to accept their

responsibilities which they voluntarily undertook and the legal
obligations and liabilities resulting from the release in that
agreement.
By the release language of this agreement, Plaintiffs
released all claims against Defendants, including all the claims
in this case, known and unknown.

The trial court particularly

erred by refusing to enforce the release provisions and voiding
the Redemption Agreement, but still purporting to enforce some of
its other provisions.

(Judgment, p.10 - Add. "P")

This Court

should enforce the release according to its plain language and
reverse the judgment below.
-40-
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POINT II
THE AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IS FATALLY FLAWED BECAUSE
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOWED THE JURY TO CONSIDER
MR. GARNER'S WEALTH AND EXERCISE UNSTRUCTURED CAPRICE
A

The Trial Court Improperly Allowed the Jurors to Hear and
Consider Claims and Evidence of Defendant Garner's Wealth,
]

No Relevant Purpose is Served by Allowing the Jury to
Consider Evidence of a Defendant's Financial Wealth.
•'ar.it ;vs:' damages are a powerful weapon in rhe
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Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, Bl)2 (Utah
111 S 9 111 )
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Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co, v. Haslip,
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, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 1056 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
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on punitive damages).
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action the jury awarded Plaintiffs $1.8 million in punitive
damages.

The trial judge refused to ameliorate the jury's "over

indulgence."

(Memorandum Decision; R. 6:2532)

Crookston fixes the primary responsibility for review of
punitive damage awards and provides a "mechanism" for "further
development of the law."

Crookston, 817 P.2d at 813.

The

instant matter is such a case for "further development."
However, Crookston provides little or no guidance to a trial
judge or jury as to the means or methods to be employed in the
initial consideration and determination of an amount of damages
to be awarded, if any, to achieve the valid purposes of
deterrence or retribution.

Such guidance is most critical to a

"sounder law" of punitive damages which Defendants, and, we
believe, this Court seek.
From the opening moments of the trial, Plaintiffs were
allowed to parade before the jury Mr. Garner's financial
condition and ostensible wealth as a "multi-millionaire."
1:2919; V:3700-13; VII:4124-5)

(Tr.

Jurors were also later instructed

that they must consider Defendants' wealth in assessing an amount
of punitive damages.

(Instr. 51; R. 5:1852) This Court has

recognized that a permissible factor employed in assessing the
amount of punitives to be awarded includes the "relative wealth
of the Defendant."
771 (Utah 1985).

Id. at 808; Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766,

However, as Crookston observes, no objective

Utah analysis has ever considered whether, in fact, the issue of
a defendant's "wealth" is a legitimate factor.
-42-
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Browning - Ferris Industries, Inc, v. K c c disposal,
Inc. , 492 U.S. 257, 281 (1 989) (Brennan, j"." and Marshall, J.,
concurring).
Annotation, "Punitive Damages: Relationship to
Defendant's Wealth," 87 A.L.R. 4th 141 (1991).
^ Abraham and Jeffries, "Punitive Damages and the Rule of
Law: The Role of Defendant's Wealth," 18 J. Legal Studies 415
(J 1 m e 1 9 8 9 ) (wealt .h is irrelevant to the goals of a s s e s s i n g
r e t r i b u t i o n or d e t e r r i n g socially u n d e s i r a b l e c o n d u c t ) ; C a s e
N o t e , "The U s e of E v i d e n c e of W e a l t h in A s s e s s i n g P u n i t i v e
D a m a g e s in N e w Y o r k : Rupert v. S e l l e r s , " 44 A l b . L . R e v . 4 2 2
( 1 9 8 0 ) ; C h a p m a n a n d T r e b i l c o c k , "Punitive D a m a g e s : D i v e r g e n c e
S e a r c h of a Rat i onal e," 40 Ala T. R P W 7*1 J 777-829 (Spri ng 1989),
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condition in the instant matter encouraged jurors to focus upon
his "status," with sugar-plumed visions of his wealth, and not
upon his conduct.

Jurors were invited to speculate on what else

may have occurred in Defendant's past that resulted in his
financial success.

J

The actual and prejudicial harm to

Defendants from allowing jurors to consider such irrelevant
evidence is obvious.
Defendants submit that upon a thoughtful, objective
analysis, evidence of Defendants1 financial condition should
clearly be seen as irrelevant, either to compensate the
Plaintiffs for their claimed wrongs or to serve any legitimate
purpose of punishment or deterrence from conduct.

This Court

should no longer blindly accept the unevaluated notion that
jurors must consider a defendant's wealth when assessing the
liability for or the amount of punitive damages.

The mandatory

nature of the instruction, without flexible guidelines, invites
virtual bankruptcy of a defendant, particularly in this case.
2.

The Trial Court Improperly Refused to Require a Finding
of Liability for Punitive Damages Before Admitting
Evidence of Defendant's Wealth Dnder Utah Code Ann.
§78-18-1(2) (1992).
Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1(2) (1992) requires that:

Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition
shall be admissible only after a finding of liability
for punitive damages has been made.
From the beginning of the trial, including Plaintiffs'
opening statement, the jurors were repeatedly advised that
13

18 J. Legal Studies at 416.
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Mr. Garner was a "multi-millionaire".
VII:4124-5)

(Tr. 1:2919; 11:3700-13;

Even if such evidence is perceived relevant to

affixing exemplary punishment, Defendants' financial ability to
pay has absolutely no relevance whatever to the jury's
consideration of Defendants' liability in the first instance.
The prejudice to Defendants in allowing allegations and evidence
of Mr. Garner's wealth to be repeatedly paraded before the jurors
is obvious.

"Rich men do not fare well before juries, and the

more emphasis placed on their riches, the less well they fare."14
Having denied Defendants' pre-trial motion in limine,
the trial court also repeatedly denied their trial objections to
the numerous references to Defendants' financial condition.
(Tr. V:3700-03; VII:4123-25)

Calling Mr. Garner as their own

witness, Plaintiffs were allowed to lead a virtually unrestricted
exploring foray into Mr. Garner's private finances, including his
previous divorce from his wife.

(Tr. V:3703-16, 3732-36)

Indeed, the Court even allowed Plaintiffs to introduce financial
summary exhibits, detailing not only the assets of Mr. Garner
(which were primarily of a non-liquid nature), but also those of
his wife, a non-party who owns substantial assets in her own
right.

(Tr. V:3703-10; VII:4122-26; VII:4235-37)

-^Morris, "Punitive Damages in Tort Cases," 44 Harv. L. Rev.
1173, 1191 (1931); See also Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121,
1127-8 (Wyo. 1981), Cf. Ellis, "Punitive Damages, Due Process,
and the Jury," 40 Ala.L.Rev. 975, 1001, (Spring 1989) ("The risks
confronting a defendant from whom punitive damages are sought are
daunting, especially where the case is complex and the defendant
is not popular . . . " ) .
-45-
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All of this evidence of finances and "ability to pay"
were prominently interwoven with Plaintiffs' cries of fraud and
deceit, and all before the jury had made any determination or
finding of any liability.

Defendants' wealth was obviously and

prejudicially displayed by Plaintiffs to jurors who were
requested to rectify Plaintiffs' claimed wrongs and find that
this multi-millionaire Defendant should "pay" for those wrongs.
In enacting §78-18-1 in 1989, the Legislature
recognized a defendant's legitimate privacy and due process
interests to be heard by an impartial, unprejudiced jury and to
have liability and any compensation fixed without reference to
his wealth.

"The jury should determine whether there has been a

breach in the standard first without looking at any assets, and
then after that they should have a right to look at the assets."
Senator H. Barlow, Senate Debate, SB24, Feb. 2, 1989, Day No. 25,
48th Legislature, Tape No. 25.
Refusing to apply §78-18-1(2), the trial court
considered the statute "not applicable" but "prospective only"
for "reasons" argued by the Plaintiffs.

(M. Entry, R. 4:1398)

On appeal, this Court gives no deference to the trial judge's
interpretation of either the statute or to the admissibility of
the evidence of Mr. Garner's wealth.

These questions of law are

reviewed by this Court under a "correctness standard."

City of

West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah
1988); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
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Section 78-18-1 was enacted/ effective May 1, 1989, and
"applies to all claims for punitive damages that arise on or
after that date."

1989 Utah Laws 717, §4. Plaintiffs argued,

and the judge agreed, that their claims "arose" prior to the
statute's effective date.

However, Plaintiffs1 own trial

testimony was clear that while the mausoleum and partnership
agreements were fashioned in 1987 and 1988, other dealings
complained of and Plaintiffs1 alleged "discovery" of the claimed
"fraud" and misrepresentations occurred in May 1990, well after
And, Plaintiffs1 complaint was

the effective date of the act.
not even filed until July 1990.

Defendants submit that in order for Plaintiffs to avoid
the release provisions of the Redemption Agreement, which was
executed in March 1989, Plaintiffs must establish that their
claims did not arise until their alleged discovery of the facts
in 1990.

If, as Plaintiffs argued to the trial court to avoid

bifurcation, their claims "arose" before May 1989, then such
claims also arose prior to and were released by Plaintiffs in
their March 1989 Redemption Agreement.

If, as Plaintiffs now

contend, their claims were still undiscovered when the March 1989
Release of Claims was given and Plaintiffs could not have
released claims they did not discover until May 1990 or later,
then these punitive damage claims are subject to the bifurcated
trial procedure mandated by §78-18-1.
Subsection (2) of §78-18-1 is also "procedural" in
nature because it prescribes a bifurcated trial procedure by
-47-
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which Plaintiffs1 substantive fraud and damage claims are to be
considered.

Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc.,

731 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1986).

Accord Boucofski v. Jacobsen,

36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 (1909).

There is nothing "substantive"

or "prospective-only" in this statute that would enlarge or
eliminate Plaintiffs1 right to show exemplary damages.

To

require Plaintiffs to recognize Defendants' right to a fair
consideration of Plaintiffs' claims by a jury, untainted by
irrelevant evidence of wealth, should not be applied
"prospective-only."

Because a procedural statute applies not

only to future actions but to accrued and pending actions as
well, §78-18-1(2) was in effect during the entire pendency of
this action and should have governed the trial procedure.15
Liability for punitive damages should have been first determined
before any reference to or evidence of Defendants' wealth was
presented to the jury.
We submit that this bifurcated trial statute, which was
effective over one year prior to the filing of the Complaint in
this action, was specifically intended, to apply to trials, such
as this case, involving complex business transactions and
investments and strong emotions.

Plaintiffs seek damages

astronomical to an average juror, and taint Defendant as a
"multimillionaire" before the first witness even takes the stand.
Any contention that the jury would not be influenced by
15

Docutel Olivetti Corp., 731 P.2d at 478; Petty v. Clark,
113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948).
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Defendants' wealth when they later considered Plaintiffs'
parroting cries of fraud is incredulous.
Before the trial, Plaintiffs indignantly insisted that
"profound reasons" of policy, "pragmatic realities," and "past
practice" precluded the application of this statutorily-mandated
bifurcation.

(Mem. Opp., R. 3:1266-67)

Instead of sound

analysis and discussion of those "reasons" and "realities,"
Plaintiffs provided only derogatory invectives.

Plaintiffs

viewed their own selfish interests and refused to recognize that
defendants also have legitimate rights and interests to be
protected and balanced against plaintiffs'.

The only substantive

objections Plaintiffs voiced against bifurcating the substantive
issues from the punitive damages were allegations of delay,
piecemeal litigation and "past practice."

These objections to

bifurcation have been soundly rejected by both cases and
commentators.
To require a jury first to find that a plaintiff is
entitled to a punitive damage award before any evidence of wealth
is considered does not materially delay or "piecemeal" the trial
proceeding.

Any such inconvenience is, at worst, minor,

particularly when compared to the prejudice the defendant suffers
from the current method the court employed.16

There is no delay

when discovery of wealth is allowed (after a prima facie showing)
16

Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121 (Wyo. 1981). Rupert v.
Sellers, 48 A.D.2d 265, 368 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1975); Cf. Miller v.
O'Neill, 775 S.W.2d 56 (Tex.Ct.App. 1989) (quoting Campen with
approval in upholding the trial court's ordered bifurcation).
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at the pretrial discovery stage.

There is no delay when a jury

decides punitive damages should be awarded.

A plaintiff can

immediately submit evidence of a defendant's wealth before the
same jurors and allow the jury immediately to deliberate further
on the proper amount to be awarded.
"Results Most Embarrassing:

Powell and Leiferman,

Discovery and Admissibility of Net

Worth of the Defendant," 40 Baylor L.Rev. 527, 544 (1988).
Bifurcation of trial proceedings may well enhance
"speedier" litigation overall because the original proceeding is
quicker, with less disruption given to irrelevant matters.

Any

need to hear or consider evidence regarding the amount of
punitives later is eliminated when the evidence shows that an
award would be unjustified.

A defendant's rights are recognized

and a plaintiff's claims are still considered in their proper
context.

Balance between the competing interests is preserved.

Bifurcation of punitive damage issues is "sound rationale." '
The bifurcation of punitive damage issues or other
means of limiting the admissibility of a defendant's financial
condition is neither novel or unique.

Several states have

enacted statutory provisions which similarly restrict the
admissibility and/or discovery of a defendant's financial

17

44 Alb.L.Rev., at 442-3. See also 40 Ala.L.Rev. at 9991007 (Bifurcation alleviates juries' confusions and is either
required by statute or allowed by discretion in most
jurisdictions).
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condition where claims for punitive damages are asserted. °
Other state courts have led the way in balancing and protecting
both defendant's and plaintiff's interests in the absence of
legislative action.

See Campen v. Stone/ 635 P.2d 1121 (Wyo.

1981); Rupert v. Sellers, 48 A.D.2d 265, 368 N.Y.Supp.2d 904
(1975); Gierman v. Toman, 77 N.J.Super. 18, 185 A.2d 241
(1962) . 1 9
Defendants submit that they are equally entitled to the
same fair and unprejudicial hearing of the claims and defenses in
this case as Plaintiffs.

The trial court's refusal to bifurcate

the proceeding and to preclude evidence of Defendants' financial
condition until after a finding of liability was prejudicial
error as a matter of law.

The jury's verdict was clearly tainted

xo

Iowa Code Ann. §668A.l (West 1991) (A prima facia case of
"willful, wanton disregard" required to admit wealth evidence);
Md. [Courts and Judicial Proceedings] Code Ann. §10-913 (1988)
(Evidence of financial condition not admissible until liability
found); Minn. Stat. Ann. §549.20 (West 1983) (Liability and
damages shall be first awarded before admission of wealth
evidence); Mo. Ann. Stat. §510.263 (Vernon 1987) (Wealth evidence
admissible only in second proceeding); Mont. Code Ann.
§27-1-221(7) (1978) (Wealth evidence not admissible in liability
phase of trial and must be considered in a separate proceeding);
Or. Rev. St. §41.315 (1989) (Prima facia evidence required before
admission of wealth evidence).
x

*See also Miller v. O'Neill, 775 S.W.2d 56 (Tex.Ct.App.
1989) (The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
bifurcating the issue of punitive damage and wealth evidence.);
Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 589 So.2d 684 (Ala. 1991)
(Evidence of wealth is inadmissible during the liability phase of
a trial for the purpose of proving the amount of punitive damages
to be assessed.)
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by references to and evidence of the financial conditions of
Defendants and of even a non-party.
B.

The Punitive Damages Awarded are Excessive and Result from
the Jury's Passion and Prejudice.
The jury awarded Plaintiffs $1.8 million in punitive

damages.

The sheer size of this award alone requires careful

scrutiny consistent with the criteria for such awards.
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 808-13. While Defendants did challenge
the size of this award in a post-verdict motion for relief
(R. 5:1920-22, 1937-67), the trial court upheld the award and
denied the post-verdict motion, based only upon Plaintiffs'
arguments in response to the motion.

(R. 6:2181-2219, 2533-37)

Remittitur of a punitive damage award is appropriate when,
inter alia, (1) the award exceeds the proper ratio, (2) there is
a "lack of intent or a low degree of malice," or (3) "a
substantial risk of bankrupting the defendant" exists.
811-12.

Id. at

Where the amount of punitives exceeds $100,000, then

even a ratio less than three-to-one indicates "some inclination"
by this Court to overturn or reduce the award.

Id. at 810-11.

The jury measured the legal damages for the "fraud" at
$447,034.00, the difference of the Mausoleum's value, as
represented by Defendants, over the Mausoleum's actual fair
market value.

(Verdict, II IV, A, 1; Add. "F")

The $1.8 million

punitive award is more than four times these legal damages
assessed for the "fraud."
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The trial court erroneously justified this award on the
ground that the punitives were less than the $2.4 million awarded
under Plaintiffs1 rescission and restitution theory.

However,

Defendants submit that the only proper measuring stick for
punitives is the amount of legal damages, and not the amount
awarded as restitution.

Plaintiffs' "restitution" included over

$1 million in investment interest and costs of operating the
Mausoleum while in Plaintiffs' exclusive control and possession.
(Exh. 89 - App.)

Given Defendants' lack of control over these

expenditures, no legitimate, salutary purpose can be served by
punishing Defendants for Plaintiffs' mismanagement decisions.
Even if one accepts Alldredge's self-serving testimony that
the construction of wood crypts was misrepresented, there is no
evidence of malice.

Defendant Garner has had a long-standing

preference for the natural warmth of wood as a construction
material.

(Tr.IX:4592)

He was proud of wood and extolled its

benefits, prompting reference to Mr. Garner as an "innovator."
(Tr. IX:4652, 4655)
And, as already argued herein, the wood construction of the
outdoor crypts was not a material issue.

Defendants had earlier

left the crypts open for public view for a period of almost two
years during their construction.

Defendants never prevented

Plaintiffs from discovering the construction or composition, and
had even invited Plaintiff Alldredge to participate in an
entombment where the inner construction material was plainly
evident.

Mr. Garner's representations as claimed by Plaintiffs
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could not have been "intended" to harm Plaintiffs or others when
the plan at the beginning was to have Plaintiff Ong own 50% of
the stock in the Mausoleum, Garner owning 25%, Alldredge 10%, and
the corporation to continue to own and operate the mausoleum
business.

(Exh. Ill)

It was later changed to a partnership.

(Exh. 28 - App.)
Finally, the total award in this case, including the
component for punitive damages, comes very close to achieving not
recompense, but Mr. Garner's financial bankruptcy.20

At trial,

Mr. Garner had less than $2 million in liquid assets.
App.)

(Exh. 91 -

His non-liquid assets were not easily convertible to cash.

Mr. Garner outlined his current financial situation to the trial
court with his belief that he must pursue relief in the
bankruptcy court if forced immediately to liquidate his assets.
(R. 5:1980-84, 1111 4, 6)

Only with assistance of his wife was he

ultimately able to post a supersedeas bond that saved him from
forced execution sales of all his assets.

Even so, he has had to

pledge everything he has as security for the bond.
13)

(R. 7:2610-

As this Court is aware, Plaintiffs rejected Mr. Garner's

offer to pledge all of his assets to Plaintiffs as a supersedeas
bond on appeal.
20

See Ace Truck & Equipment Rentals, Inc., v. Kahn,
103 Nev. 503, 746 P.2d 132 (1987) (A punitive award of 30 percent
of defendant's net worth is far in excess of that reasonably
necessary to punish defendant and deter others); National Bank of
Monticello v. Doss, 141 111.App.3d 1065, 491 N.E.2d 106 (4th
Dist. 1986), later proceeding 163 111.App.3d 1057, 517 N.E.2d 321
(1987) (The bankruptcy of the defendant serves no useful purpose
and would smother the message that the jury intended to send by
their punitive damage award).
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If punitive damages serves any purpose of punishment, the
award in this case is overkill.

A punitive damage award should

not have the vindictive result of destroying Defendants
financially.

The jury's punitive damage award could only have

resulted from passion and prejudice against Defendants.

The

award should be vacated and a new trial ordered that will comply
with §78-18-1(2) and this Court's decision in Crookston.
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POINT III
THE VERDICT IS A PRODUCT OP PASSION AND PREJUDICE
A.

Inconsistency of Verdict and Jury Confusion,
1.

Conversion Claim.
When the jury first returned its verdict, it found no

conversion of partnership assets (Tr. XI:4829).

However, the

jury also "found" $512,098.00 damages "as a natural and direct
consequence of the conversion of assets by Keith E. Garner."
(Tr. XI:4831)

When this inconsistency was drawn to the jury's

attention the jury foreperson tried to explain the inconsistency
but could not.

(Tr. XI:4833-35)

At the court's suggestion the

jury then went back to deliberate.

(Tr. XI:4835)

When it

returned in a few moments the jury had changed its answer on the
liability question to find conversion, thereby purporting to
justify the awarded damages.

(Tr. XI:4835-37 - Add. "E")

The only factual basis for Plaintiffs' claim of
conversion regarded certain crypts in the indoor mausoleum that
were allegedly converted by Garner for his own use during the
existence of the partnership.

(Complaint, 1MI 55, 56; R. 1:15)

At trial, Mr. Garner and Susan Stewart testified that
prior to the partnership formation Mr. Garner owned a "family
room" of crypts valued at $75,000.00.
IX:4601-09)

This was shown on the inventory of unsold crypts

furnished to Plaintiffs.
Exh. 202)

(Tr. VIII:4342-3;

(Exh. 28, p.D1100082 - App.; Cf.

Garner had decided to return the family room to the

unsold inventory in exchange for various other individual crypts
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in the indoor mausoleum also having a value up to $75,000.00.
(Tr. IX:4606-08)

Garner further testified that this exchange was

reviewed with Plaintiffs in March 1988 in Hong Kong.
objection to the exchange was ever raised.
IX:4602-3)

No

(Tr. VIII:4342-43;

Plaintiffs claimed the exchange was never disclosed

to them until just before the Redemption Agreement was signed.
(Tr. 11:3104-05)
Ms. Stewart testified that at Alldredge1s request she
prepared a list of crypts involved in the exchange, which
specified those gifted and those not yet given.

(Tr. IX:4616-

17, 4619; Exh. 205)
Regardless of whether this exchange was ever approved
by Plaintiffs, it is undisputed that Alldredge not only knew that
Garner had transferred some of these crypts, but Alldredge had
also confronted Garner about the matter before the Redemption
Agreement was signed.

(Tr. 11:3097-98)

The release language of

the Redemption Agreement clearly covered this matter.
Plaintiffs1 claim for conversion and the jury's verdict
are not supported by the evidence.

Defendants have no liability

for any alleged conversion of crypts or any other partnership
assets.

When the jury changed that answer to find liability for

conversion, it did so without any valid basis in the evidence.
The $512,098.00 conversion damage also is without any
evidentiary support in the record.

As noted, the only evidence

concerning this matter was that, at most, there were one dozen
crypts used by Garner.

(Tr. 11:3099)
-57-

Their value would not have

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

exceeded $48,000.00.

(Tr. 11:3105)

How then did the jury reach

a figure of $512,098.00 if not by improper means of passion and
prejudice?

There was no evidence of any other partnership assets

that Plaintiffs claimed were converted.

Either this lack of

evidence coupled with the evidence of Defendants' wealth
impassioned and prejudiced the jury or else so sorely confused
them that their verdict cannot stand.

2.

Fiduciary Duty Claim.
A similar lack of material, relevant evidence defeats

Plaintiffs1 claims for breach of fiduciary duty.

Mr. Alldredge

testified he was not given the management authority he was
entitled to during the early months of the partnership.
(Tr. 11:3035)

Also, that when the "joint venture" was terminated

and Defendants vacated the Mausoleum, they did not leave all the
business records of operation.

Susan Stewart testified that all

partnership accounting information was available when Defendants
left.

(Tr. IX:4614)

Plaintiffs fail to show how such can be a

"breach of fiduciary duty."

Notwithstanding any conflict of

evidence, such evidence cannot in any way justify a claim of
breach of a "fiduciary duty."
More importantly, there was no evidence by which the
jury could determine any damages for any alleged breach of
fiduciary duty.

In short, the jury could only speculate as to

the amount of such damages, if any.
reversible error.

Their speculation is simply

Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414,
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418-19 (Utah 1989) (reversing award for lost profits for lack of
adequate proof of the fact of loss, causation, and the amount
lost).

3.

"Consequential Damages"
The jury's award of $1,165,022.00 in connection with

the rescission as the amount necessary to put Plaintiffs back in
their position before entering the partnership includes
$87,860.00 as a claimed "return on investment," in addition to
interest allegedly paid on borrowed funds.

(Exh. 89 - App.)

Plaintiffs claimed $603,472.00 in "cash advances" to operate the
Mausoleum and $473,690.00 for interest paid by Plaintiffs on
those cash advances and other amounts invested in the Mausoleum.
The balance of the jury's "restitutionary" award is $87,860.00,
the amount speculated as a "reasonable rate of return" on the
money borrowed in the event they would have borrowed it and
invested it elsewhere.

Such an award is hardly "restitution."

It is a vindictive windfall to Plaintiffs.
We find no Utah authority that a party is entitled, as an
element of rescission, to any more than what was actually paid
and, when appropriate, interest thereon.21

We do not find any

Utah authority that can justify a speculated return on some
speculated investment as a part of restitution damages.
21

See Dugan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955, 957 (Utah 1986) (In
rescission, the buyers are returned to the "status quo" and to
recover the payments made on the contract, less the fair rental
value of the premises for their time in possession.)
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Defendants submit that this inquiry is so inherently speculative
that it cannot support the award of $87,860.00 as
"restitutionary" compensation.

Canyon Country Store v. Bracey,

781 P.2d at 418-19.
B.

The Verdict was Prejudicially Tainted by Erroneous Rulings
and Comments by the Trial Court.
1.

Inadequate and Untimely Election of Remedies by
Plaintiffs.
The trial court never required Plaintiffs to elect

either rescission or damages as their remedy.

Although

Plaintiffs finally and reluctantly purported to elect their
remedies just prior to trial, they continued to claim rescission
against Defendant 11th Avenue Corporation as well as the benefit
of their bargain (e.g., "legal" damages) against Defendant
Garner.

(R. 3:1208-11)

election at all.

Their purported election was really no

The trial court refused to enforce any choice

of remedies and thereby advantaged Plaintiffs with the best of
both worlds.
Plaintiffs were allowed to present the opinion of an
appraiser, Mr. Lang, that the Mausoleum had a present negative
net worth.

(Tr. VI:4063)

Such evidence would be irrelevant to

rescission, had Plaintiffs really elected that remedy.
Plaintiffs were also able to explore various economic theories as
fraud damage awards through such witnesses as Cramer Stiff, the
"sales consultant," and Grant Caldwell, and trial exhibits 82
and 90.

This significant additional testimony of exploratory

economic theories of damages undoubtedly confused the jury and
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encouraged them to escalate the damage awards.

Such evidence was

irrelevant and inadmissible, yet Defendants1 objections thereto
were overruled by the trial court.

The court allowed Plaintiffs

to proceed with inconsistent remedies all through the trial.
To allow Plaintiffs to choose their remedy then ignore
their election, and allow them to advance on both fronts, permits
a "double recovery" and engendered the confusion and excess that
permeates the verdict.

"Election of Remedies" doctrine is

intended to "prevent double redress for a single wrong" and
"presupposes a choice between inconsistent remedies," foregoing
all others.

Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp.,

603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979).

2.

Prejudicial Trial Rulings and Comments by Trial Court.
Numerous rulings and comments, as well as the demeanor

of the trial judge during the trial, improperly influenced the
jury with the court's bias and predilections.

Individually, each

situation may not appear significant, but as a whole they wove a
tight curtain between Defendants and the jurors.

This fabric

underscores the prejudicial nature of the trial court's other
errors argued in this brief.

Some of those errors, listed in the

order of their occurrence, are:
a.

The court erred in refusing to receive as exhibits

certain real estate listing agreements to sell the Mausoleum
property signed by Plaintiff Alldredge in 1990-91, after his
complaint was filed.

(Proposed Exhs. 213-16)
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showed that Plaintiffs continued to exercise dominion over the
property and that their earlier rescission demand had been
waived.

(Tr. 111:3299-3301)
b.

The court unduly restricted Defendants' cross-

examination of Roger Evans, the Director of Building and Housing
Services for Salt Lake City.

Evans supervised the issuance of

building permits and inspections made pursuant thereto.

He

testified on direct examination by Plaintiffs1 counsel that his
office had voided a building permit for the outdoor garden
pavilions in early 1987, and that such permit had not since been
activated (Tr. IV:3485-86).

The court refused to allow

Defendants1 counsel to cross-examine as to whether the wood
construction of the crypts was any bar to having the building
permit renewed.

The court opined that Evans was not the right

witness to answer that question.
c.

(Tr. IV:3491-93; VIII:4441)

Robert Ord, the licensed contractor engaged to

build the outdoor garden pavilions and crypts, was not allowed to
explain to the jury why he thought wood was an acceptable and
appropriate building material for this construction.

The court

refused the evidence because Mr. Ord had never before built
crypts, but then demeaned the witness and his experience and
qualifications by adding:

"Building a tree hut from wood might

be one thing, but building crypts is quite another."
(Tr. IV:3548)

Mr. Ord's experience as a building contractor

certainly qualified him to testify about the quality and
durability of wood as a building material.
-62-
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demeaned the testimony of Mr. Lucero, who built the outdoor
crypts, by stating, gratuitously:
or wood worker."
d.

"This man is a cement worker

(Tr. IV:3470-71)

When Mr. Garner testified on direct examination as

an adverse Plaintiffs1 witness, the court referred to the
proceedings as a "three-ring circus" when Mr. Garner attempted to
explain his answers to counsel's examination questions, and the
court continued to interrupt Mr. Garner's answers.

(Tr. V:3682,

3688, 3691)
e.

When Defendants1 attorney objected to Plaintiffs1

Exhibit 105, a corporate tax return, the court of its own
volition and without any prompting or prior foundation, queried
whether "the thrust of this questioning is to establish an
alleged under-reporting to the I.R.S.," implying to the jury that
"multi-millionaire" Mr. Garner was also cheating the government.
(Tr. V:3700)

The court refused to receive the tax return

(Tr. V:3701), but most certainly damaged Defendants more by the
unrestrained comment.
f.

During cross-examination of Steven Nielson, an

insurance agent, and Ms. Lenois, a former employee of an
independent sales group that had sold crypts in 1984 and 1985,
the court refused to allow Defendants to show the bias and
prejudice of these witnesses.

(Tr. V:3795-96; VI:3946)

This

unjustified abridgement impinged Defendants1 right of crossexamination.

Utah Rules of Evidence 607, 608(c); Utah Code Ann.

§78-24-1; State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 656 (Utah 1985).
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Plaintiffs then argued to the jury in closing argument that
Lenois and Nielson were neutral and unbiased witnesses, while
Defendants1 opposing witnesses were all friends of Mr. Garner and
part of his "circus of fraud."
4764)

(Tr. X:4731-32, 4739, 4741, 4761,

However, when the shoe was on the other foot, the Court

allowed Plaintiffs to pursue possible bias of Defendants'
witnesses, even suggesting that the "credibility" of the
witnesses was in doubt.
g.
opine:

(Tr. VIII:4317, 4359)

Plaintiffs1 accountant expert was allowed to

"There's obviously legal obligations involved in

connection with those who have purchased the dysfunctional
crypts."

(Emphasis added.)

(Tr. VII:4161-62)

Counsel's motion

to strike the gratuitous characterizations was denied, suggesting
to the jury that the trial judge agreed that the crypts were
"dysfunctional."
h.

The trial court received in evidence Exhibits 317

and 318, containing summaries of Mr. Garner's tax returns, filed
jointly with his wife.

The returns and the resulting summaries

(Exhs. 317, 318 - App.) also reflected Mrs. Garner's separate
income and assets.
i.

(Exhs. 317, 318 - App.; Tr. VII:4235-6)

When defense counsel asked Dr. Schroeder, a

professor of wood chemistry at Colorado State University, to
explain the properties of wood and its suitability for outdoor
garden crypts, Plaintiffs objected to the testimony as
"immaterial."

The court challenged Defendants' counsel and

captiously asked whether he was attempting to show that "when the
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plaintiffs bought concrete and got wood, they got a bargain?
that what you are telling me?11

(Tr. VII:4258-60)

Is

Taking the

court's cue, this "bargain" theme was later hammered home in
Plaintiffs1 closing argument.
j.

(Tr. X:4761-62)

Later during the direct examination of

Dr. Schroeder, the court refused to allow him to describe what he
meant when he said the wood in the crypts was "durable."
(Tr. VII:4257-58)

The court asserted that the "durable" nature

of the wood was irrelevant, even though Defendants argued that
Plaintiffs were required to show that the claimed
misrepresentations were material.

(Tr. VII:4257-58)

Plaintiffs

consistently attempted to suggest that wood crypts were not
adequate.

(Tr. 11:3096; VII:4097-99; X:4738-39)

Materiality is an indispensable element of a claim of fraud
and negligent misrepresentation.

Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239,

1246 (Utah 1980); Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown &
Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986).

Defendants were

allowed only to proffer the remaining testimony of Dr. Schroeder
(Tr. VII:4260; Tr. Aug. 21, 1991:4495-99), which proffer was
rejected by the court.
k.

(Tr. IX:4707-08)

The court improperly struck the testimony of

Mr. Reaveley, a structural engineer, who explained that the
crypts were constructed in a workmanlike manner.

The court

concluded that Mr. Reaveley1s qualifications and experience
as a structural engineer were insufficient foundation.
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(Tr. VII:4276-77)

Such a decision far exceeded the bounds of a

reasonable exercise of discretion.
1.

The court allowed Steve Nielson (an insurance

agent who "toured" the Mausoleum while considering possible
insurance coverage) to testify that Mr. Garner said the crypts
were built like a "bunker." (Tr. V:3765, 3788)

Conversely, the

court struck "as irrelevant" the testimony of Mr. Landvatter,
another insurance broker who was also present on the same "tour"
as Mr. Nielson to the effect that Mr. Garner was referring to the
older, main Mausoleum building when the statement was made.
(Tr. VIII:4313-14)
m.

After allowing Plaintiffs1 attorney wide latitude

in his examination of Mr. Garner, the court unduly restricted
Mr. Garner's testimony on cross-examination and sustained
Plaintiffs' objections.

For example, in one such instance Mr.

Garner was asked to describe how he was able to explain to
Plaintiffs in the April 1987 tour of the premises that wood was
an appropriate material for crypts:
Q.

[by Mr. Nielsen] Now, at that particular time,
what was the stage of the outdoor pavilions?

A.

[Mr. Garner] They were all completed except we
had a shortage of some 80-100 marble frontings and
they had not been placed in the various pavilions.

Q.

What result did that have with reference to the
observation or [of] the inside of these crypts?

A.

Well, I was able to explain to them I'd designed
the outdoor pavilion, and that it was — made it
appropriate to use wood in the interior for the
housing of the coffins.

Q.

Why was that?

How was that accomplished?
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A.

Well, I told [them] the building — I'd never seen
one like this where we create a shell made out of
reinforced concrete and steel and then put a
Bartile roof on it, and I put a six-foot overhang
on the one end of it and that protected the crypts
on the inside, I called the crypts. It wasn't
like a closed-in mausoleum. It was open. We had
nature's air conditioning. We had fresh air. We
had the weather. We had no electrical. And
whenever I had seen outdoor crypts in the past,
after a few years marble looses its luster and
this way it would be beautiful forever, and I was
proud of it. I still am.
Mr. Campbell: Just a minute. Wait a minute.
Your Honor, I object to that. This is a speech.
We're suppose to be talking about now some —
The Court:

Non-responsive?

Mr. Campbell:
The Court:

It's non-responsive.

Objection is sustained.

(Tr. VIII:4322-23)
n.

When Mr. James Richards, Mr. Garner's attorney in

1989, testified that the release language of the Redemption
Agreement was supplied by Plaintiffs' California attorney, the
court allowed Plaintiffs' counsel to quote from court decisions
in cross-examining Mr. Richards as to whether he was aware of
those specific statements of Utah law at the time he helped draft
the Redemption Agreement.

The court permitted Plaintiffs1

counsel to continue reading, even after Mr. Richards said that he
had not specifically researched the issue of releasing claims for
fraud.

(Tr. VIII:4483-4489)
o.

Plaintiffs' attorney was permitted on cross-

examination to inquire of Mr. Funk whether he had testified for
Mr. Garner as an expert in prior cases.

(Tr. IX:4536-8)
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Not

only did counsel intend to impugn Mr. Funk's credibility as an
expert/ but also to suggest that Mr. Garner had been a defendant
in prior cases.

However, on redirectf Defendants1 counsel was

not permitted to ask Mr. Funk further regarding the occasions in
which he had previously testified as an expert witness.

The

court sustained Plaintiffs' objection as "irrelevant."
(Tr. IX:4570)
Under similar circumstances, this Court has found
such a ruling to be prejudicial error requiring a new trial.
King v. Barron/ 770 P.2d 975/ 977-980 (Utah 1988).

The same

result and reasoning apply here.
p.

Dr. Burtis Evans# a prominent local physician who

was also a friend of Mr. Garnerf testified that he had been with
Mr. Garner and Mr. Alldredge in July 1987 at the outdoor garden
pavilions when Mr. Alldredge was told by Mr. Garner about the
wood crypts which Alldredge then observed.

(Tr. IX:4650-55)

During that examination, the court undermined Dr. Evans'
credibility by several rulings and comments.
4671-72/ 4677-78/ 4684-85)

(Tr. IX:4654/

Plaintiffs' counsel was permitted to

comment to the jury in closing argument on the court's
"admonishments" to Dr. Evans:
[a]nd then we have this bizarre piece of evidence from
Burtis Evans, and I submit to you this is [a] man that
came into this courtroom yesterday and he was going to
set the record straight/ he was going to tell us all
about this question. He couldn't answer a question/ no
matter how simple it wasf I think virtually if his life
depended on it. The Court admonished him at least a
half a dozen times. We took twice as long examining
because most of the time it simply was to ask him the
same question twice.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-68-

(Tr. X:4745-46)
q.

Finally, the trial court's hostility toward

Defendants, or his own confusion of the evidence, is.well
exemplified in his Memorandum Decision denying Defendants' motion
for new trial.

The court's comments therein express the court's

view of the evidence that cannot be supported by the record
herein.

First, the Court stated:

Certain of Garner's assets were misrepresented at trial
which misrepresentation was established by crossexamination. Garner testified on direct examination
that his wife was awarded the La Jolla, California
residence in their 1982 divorce. When confronted with
the original divorce file showing Garner was awarded
the property, his original statement was retracted.
(R. 6:2534; Add. MG")
At trial, Mr. Garner truthfully answered that the
La Jolla home was in his wife's name.

When asked whether she

received it in the divorce proceeding, Mr. Garner answered "I
think it was, yes."

(Tr. V:3714)

Then, after a lunch break,

Plaintiffs were allowed to recall Mr. Garner to the witness stand
to further pursue the matter.

Upon further examination

Mr. Garner agreed that the original divorce decree had awarded
the La Jolla home to him.

(Tr. V:3734)

When given an

opportunity to explain himself, Mr. Garner testified that he had
assumed certain liabilities in the divorce which had not
materialized.

To help even out the stipulated property division

in the divorce, he had assigned the La Jolla home to his former
and again current spouse, in a later property agreement.

-69-
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(Tr. V:3736)

Yet, the trial court claimed Mr. Garner's answers

were "misrepresentations."
r.

On a subsequent page of his decision, the court

stated that "Garner misrepresented the nature of the plywood
crypts to everyone necessary to advance his fraud, including
customers, insurance agents, building inspectors, his own staff,
and his partners."

(R. 6:2535 - Add. "G")

The record is devoid

of any evidence that Garner misrepresented the wood nature of the
outdoor crypts to any customer, his own staff or building
inspectors.

The only testimony of any misrepresentation by

Mr. Garner came from Plaintiffs and Steve Nielson.

The latter

testified that in May or June, when he saw the outdoor pavilion,
the crypts were all covered with marble, which could not
physically have occurred because the marble did not arrive until
August 1987.

(Tr. V:3773-74; VIII:4446)

Moreover, Nielson

acknowledged having earlier seen the wood crypt frameworks.

(Tr.

V:3794-95)
s.

The trial court continued, commenting on "the

effect on the lives of the hundreds of crypts owners who believed
they had purchased cement rather than plywood crypts for
themselves and loved ones.
the public as well as Ong."

This case presents a serious fraud on
(R. 6:2535-36) The only purchasers

of outdoor crypts who may have received something different than
what they believed were Mr. and Mrs. James Cummings.
(Tr. VI:4023-25)

They did not receive any representation from

Mr. Garner, but learned what they did from an independent
-70-
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salesperson in 1984, as supplemented by a letter from Sandy
Lenois in 1985.

(Tr. VI:4017-18, 4023-27; Exh. 70)

Ms. Lenois

likewise did not get her information from Mr. Garner.
VI:3939-40)

(Tr.

For that reason, Defendants had earlier filed a

motion in limine to exclude such testimony (R. 2:830-43) which
was denied.

(R. 4:1398)

In any event/ two people are not

"hundreds."

Dr. Kovalenko and his wife, both crypt purchasers,

were told they were getting crypts to be constructed of wood
before they were even built and later saw the wood crypts during
their construction.

(Tr. VIII:4387-88)

There is no evidence that any crypt purchaser was
ever prevented from similarly viewing the crypts during the
course of construction, even if any original explanation of the
crypts' nature at the time of purchase was ambiguous, which the
evidence did not show.

The court's hostility to Defendants was

just as readily apparent to the jury during the trial as it is
apparent in the hyperbole of the Memorandum Decision.

(Add. "G"

- R. 6:2532-38)
The trial court allowed itself to be taken in by
Plaintiffs' abundant innuendo.

The court's jaundiced view was

undoubtedly a significant factor in its rulings and in the jury's
perception of those rulings.

Such rulings, collectively if not

individually, could only have influenced the jury against
Defendants, notwithstanding a jury instruction that the jurors
were the "sole judge of the facts."

-71-

(Jury Instr. 3; R. 5:1795)
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POINT IV
THE COURT'S SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT IMPROPERLY AWARDS
PLAINTIFFS1 LITIGATION EXPENSES WHICH ARE NOT TAXABLE COSTS
A trial court abuses its discretion when it awards as costs
expenses which are not allowed by statute, rulef or case law, no
matter what the necessity was for such expense• Frampton v,
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980).

Most recently, in Cornish Town

v. Keller, 817 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1991), this Court held that
such necessary trial expenses as the cost of photographic
exhibits, maps, and pre-trial hearing transcripts are not costs
to be awarded to a prevailing party.

Accord Kerr v. Kerr,

610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980) (Expert witness fees may not be
taxed above the statutory rate).
In a "Supplemental Judgment" entered January 2, 1992, the
trial judge awarded Plaintiffs "costs" of $12,260.00, which
included deposition costs of $11,503.00, witness fees of $631.75,
and Plaintiffs1 $125.00 filing fee.

(Cost Judgment, Add. "K")

A

significant portion of the cost award is allocated to
"depositions" which Plaintiffs claimed were necessary for trial.
However, under Frampton, deposition costs must be both (1) "taken
in good faith and, in the light of the circumstances, appear to
be essential for the development and presentation of the case,"
and (2) said depositions must also "relate to the examination of
witnesses whose testimony is deemed essential to the trial, and
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taken for potential uses testimony in the trial, . . . "
Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774. 22
In this case, a total of 43 people were deposed by both
sides prior to trial.

The court awarded Plaintiffs their

expenses for every one of the depositions taken.

At trial,

Plaintiffs only called eight witnesses who were deposed at the
Plaintiffs1 request.

(R. 6:2302, 117 - Add. "J")

The depositions

of three of those witnesses, Roger Evans, Steve Nielson and
Sandra Lenois, were not at all necessary because Plaintiffs had
already interviewed those witnesses prior to their depositions.
The cost of these three depositions was $921.95.
As to the remaining five witnesses, Plaintiffs did not
establish the essential use of those depositions at trial.

Four

of the remaining five were noticed for deposition even before
Plaintiffs served their first set of interrogatories.
6:2293-99 - App. "J")
almost $2,000.00.

(R.

The cost of these four depositions was

(R. 6:2302, 11 7b - Add. "J")

Plaintiffs are not entitled to the expenses of taking
depositions where they could have first sought what information
^ z See also Highland Constr. Co. v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.,
639 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984); Stratford v. Wood,
11 Utah 2d 251, 253, 358 P.2d 80, 81 (1961) (Survey costs in
preparation of trial are not recoverable); Morgan v. Morgan,
795 P.2d 684, 686-87 (Utah App. 1990) (Witness fees, travel
expenses and service of process expenses are chargeable only in
accordance with statutory fee schedules); Redevelopment Agency of
Salt Lake City v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112, 1124 (Utah App. 1989)
(Expert witness fees are not recoverable costs); Lloyd* s
Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 512
(Utah App. 1988) (The costs for depositions not used at trial are
not recoverable); Hatanaka v. K.E. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052, 1055
(Utah App. 1987) (Survey costs are not recoverable).
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they needed by way of other less expensive discovery request.
Highland Constr. Co., 639 P.2d at 1051.
Plaintiffs requested and were granted costs of taking 14
depositions by them when the witness never testified in court,
nor was the deposition used (R. 6:2302; Add. "J," 11 5)
costs amounted to $3,480.35.

These

It was a clear abuse of discretion

for the trial court to award Plaintiffs their deposition costs,
as it did, for every person deposed by either side.

The award of

deposition costs should be vacated.
The trial court also allowed $631.75 in witness fees.
(R. 7:6496; Add. "K")

At least 21 of the witness fees paid by

Plaintiffs exceeded the statutory rate of Utah Code Ann. §21-5-4
(1990).

(R. 5:2078-79 - Add. "I")

The court also awarded

witness fees paid to ensure a deponents attendance at his or her
deposition.

A great many of these subpoena fees were not

necessary, nor were the depositions, either because Plaintiffs
had interviewed the witnesses before deposing them, because the
witnesses would have appeared without subpoena and witness fee,
or because the witnesses were never called to testify at trial.
It is insufficient merely to cry that "oh, we might have had to
use the deposition at trial had the witness not then appeared."
As a matter of fact, they did not use the depositions "as
testimony."

Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774; see also Defendants'

Memorandum Objecting to the Witness Fees, R. 6:2271-77.
Obviously the trial court did not properly scrutinize the
costs Plaintiffs claimed.

The court abused its discretion in not
-74-
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more cautiously and judiciously examining the itemization of
Plaintiffs' litigation expenses to eliminate all but those
compensable under Utah law.

The award of witness fees should be

vacated, and if Plaintiffs are entitled to any costs whatever,
they should receive only the costs in accordance with Rule 54(d)
and the cases cited herein.

CONCLUSION
Because the release language of the Redemption Agreement was
fairly negotiated at arms-length with the assistance of legal
counsel, and it is clear and comprehensive enough to bar all of
Plaintiffs1 claims, the judgments entered below should be vacated
and reversed, with an instruction to the trial court to dismiss
all of Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.
Alternatively, for any or all of the reasons specified, the
judgments entered below should be reversed and the case remanded
for a new trial with instructions to bifurcate the issue of
punitive damages as required by law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this XH^

day of April, 1992.

/yUtX^ffttrr H. Nielsen
Gary A. Weston
John K. Mangum
Of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
60 East South Temple, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

R. Nielsen
OF-tfENRIOD, HENRIOD & NIELSEN
185 South State Street, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for
Defendants/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of April, 1992, I
served upon Plaintiffs/Appellees four true and correct
replacement copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS with
attached Addendum by causing the same to be hand-delivered to the
following:
Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Esq.
Clark W. Sessions, Esq.
Dean C. Andreasen, Esq.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
13th Floor, One Utah Center
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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March 21, 1989

Mr, Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST CO.
201 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, NJ 07044
RE:

DELIVERY OF STOCK CERTIFICATES AND ESCROW ACCOUNT

Dear Mr. Manger:
Pursuant to the ten (10) enclosed opinion letters for Mssrs.
Goldberg; Hammond; Jacobson; Lake;, Lieberman; Mauro; Pagano;
Rinaldi; Rosenthal; and Zipern (the "Shareholders"), I will inform
you that the share certificates you issued to the Shareholders will
be delivered to my escrow account.
As soon as the shares
represented by the share certificates are sold, Mr. Yagi will
arrange for payment therefor in the amount of thirty-five thousand
dollars ($35,000).
Your cooperation
appreciated.

is

assisting

the

Shareholders

Very truly yours,

William R„ Shupe
WRS/bk
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is

greatly

March 21, 1989

Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
201 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Bernard
C. Zipern; Number of Shares held: 55,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Bernard C. Zipern (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Bernard C. Zipern which are
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares,
The
following representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Zipern's knowledge, no members of
Mr. Zipernfs immediate family or others have sold any shares of
the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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Mr. Hyman Manger
New Jersey Transfer
March 21, 1989
Page 2

5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr. Zipern paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr. Zipern is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Zipern on July
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr-. Zipern in excess of three
(3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Zipern's knowledge, no members of
Mr. Zipernfs immediate family or others have sold any shares of
the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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Mr. Hyraan Manger
New Jersey Transfer
March 21, 1989
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8. That Mr. Zipern is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Zipern's holding of the Shares meets
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\nj trns fr.op2 3.9)
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March 21, 1989

Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Seymour
Rosenthal; Number of Shares held: 44,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Seymour Rosenthal (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Seymour Rosenthal which are
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares.
The
following representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Rosenthal's knowledge, no members
of Mr. Rosenthal's immediate family or others have sold any
shares of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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Mr. Hyman Manger
New Jersey Transfer
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5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Companyfs
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr. Rosenthal paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr. Rosenthal is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Rosenthal on
July 25, 1985, and have been held b£ Mr. Rosenthal in excess of
three (3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Rosenthal's knowledge, no members
of Mr. Rosenthalfs immediate family or others have sold any
shares of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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New Jersey Transfer
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8. That Mr- Rosenthal is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Rosenthal's holding of the Shares
meets the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R, Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\nj trnsfr.op2 3.9)
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March 21, 1989

Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Frank
Rinaldi; Number of Shares held: 40,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr, Frank Rinaldi (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Frank Rinaldi which are relevant
to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The following
representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Rinaldifs knowledge, no members of
Mr. Rinaldifs immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr. Rinaldi paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr. Rinaldi is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Rinaldi on July
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr.* Rinaldi in excess of three
(3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Rinaldif s knowledge, no members of
Mr. Rinaldifs immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8. That Mr. Rinaldi is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Rinaldi's holding of the Shares meets
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\nj trnsfr.op2 3.9)
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March 21, 1989

Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
201 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Frank X.
Pagano; Number of Shares held: 55/000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr- Frank X- Pagano (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Frank X. Pagano which are
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares,
The
following representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Paganofs knowledge, no members of
Mr. Paganofs immediate family or others have sold any shares of
the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr- Pagano paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr. Pagano is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Pagano on July
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr*. Pagano in excess of three
(3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Pagano's knowledge, no members of
Mr. Pagano's immediate family or others have sold any shares of
the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8. That Mr. Pagano is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Paganofs holding of the Shares meets
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\nj trnsfr.op2 3.9)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

March 21, 1989

Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
201 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr, Salvatore
Mauro; Number of Shares held: 40,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company") , you have requested our opinion (this ,lOpinionn) as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Salvatore Mauro (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Salvatore Mauro which are
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares.
The
following representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Mauro f s knowledge, no members of
Mr. Mauro f s immediate family or others have sold any shares of
the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90)' days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr. Mauro paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr. Mauro is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Mauro on July
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Mauro in excess of three
(3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Mauro1 s knowledge, no members of
Mr. Mauro 1 s immediate family or others have sold any shares of
the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8. That Mr. Mauro is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Mauro's holding of the Shares meets
the requirements of Rule 144(k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9)
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March 21, 1989

Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
201 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Daniel L.
Liberman; Number of Shares held: 55,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Daniel L. Liberman (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Daniel L. Liberman which are
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares.
The
following representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Liberman1 s knowledge, no members of
Mr. Liberman1s immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr. Liberman paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr. Liberman is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Liberman on July
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr.-Liberman in excess of three
(3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Liberman's knowledge, no members of
Mr. Liberman1s immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Companyfs issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8. That Mr. Liberman is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr, Liberman's holding of the Shares
meets the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9)
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March 21, 1989

Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Walter J.
Lake, Sr.; Number of Shares held: 46,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Walter J. Lake, Sr. (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Walter J. Lake, Sr. which are
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares.
The
following representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Lake's knowledge, no members of Mr.
Lake f s immediate family or others have sold any shares of the
Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr- Lake paid for the Shares in full on July 25, 1985,
and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date free
and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present time;
and
7. That Mr. Lake is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Lake on July 25,
1985, and have been held by Mr. Lake in excess of three (3)
years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Lake's knowledge, no members of Mr.
Lake's immediate family or others have sold any shares of the
Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently onemillion
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8. Tha4: Mr, Lake is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr, Lake's holding of the Shares meets
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\nj trnsfr.op2 3,9)
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March 21, 1989

Mr. Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
201 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Marc
Jacobson; Number of Shares held: 50,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Marc Jacobson (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 1933. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Marc Jacobson which are relevant
to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares. The following
representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Jacobson!s knowledge, no members of
Mr. Jacobsonfs immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr. Jacobson paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr. Jacobson is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Jacobson on July
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. 'Jacobson in excess of three
(3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Jacobson's knowledge, no members of
Mr. Jacobson's immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8, That Mr. Jacobson is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Jacobson's holding of the Shares
meets the requirements of Rule 144(k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\nj trnsfr.op2 3.9)
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March 21, 1989
Mr- Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
2 01 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr, Richard
Hammond; Number of Shares held: 40,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr- Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this "Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Richard Hammond (the
"Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 193 3. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Richard Hammond which are
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares.
The
following representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Hammond's knowledge, no members of
Mr. Hammond's immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr. Hammond paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7. That Mr. Hammond is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Hammond on July
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Hammond in excess of three
(3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Hammondfs knowledge, no members of
Mr. Hammondfs immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Companyfs issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8. That Mr. Hammond is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Hammond's holding of the Shares meets
the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9)
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March 21, 1989

Mr, Hyman Manger
JERSEY TRANSFER AND TRUST COMPANY
201 Bloomfield Avenue
Vernon, New Jersey 07044
RE:

Removal of legend restrictions for shares held by Mr. Harvey M.
Goldberg; Number of Shares held: 46,000 Shares Plus Warrants

Dear Mr. Manger:
As the transfer agent for National Thoroughbred Corporation
(the "Company"), you have requested our opinion (this ••Opinion") as
to whether the shares of stock held by Mr. Harvey M. Goldberg (the
'•Shares") under the circumstances contemplated in this letter, would
meet the requirements to lift their legend restrictions and be in
compliance with the Securities Act of 193 3. It is our understanding
that the Shares are currently restricted securities within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3).
In connection with the preparation of this Opinion, we have
relied upon representations by Mr. Harvey M. Goldberg which are
relevant to the lifting of the restriction on the Shares.
The
following representations have been made to us:
1.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a)(3);
2. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
3. That to the best of Mr. Goldberg's knowledge, no members of
Mr. Goldberg's immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
4. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
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5.
That the Company has represented to you there are
currently, at the time of its most recent annual report, one
million sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's
issued and outstanding common stock;
6. That Mr, Goldberg paid for the Shares in full on July 25,
1985, and he has owned the Shares beneficially since such date
free and clear of any liens and encumbrances up to the present
time; and
7 . That Mr. Goldberg is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the above, we are of the following opinion:
1. That the Shares were fully paid for by Mr. Goldberg on July
25, 1985, and have been held by Mr. Goldberg in excess of three
(3) years;
2. That information regarding the Company is publicly
available information and accessible to potential purchasers;
3.
That the Shares are restricted securities, within the
meaning of Securities Act Rule 144(a) (3) ;
4. That you have not transferred, and will not transfer, any
of the Shares unless instructed otherwise by this office;
5. That to the best of Mr. Goldbergfs knowledge, no members of
Mr. Goldberg's immediate family or others have sold any shares
of the Company within the three (3) preceding years;
6. That the Company has provided information to you establishing that it has been subject to the reporting requirements of
Sections 13 and 15(d) 8 the Securities Act of 1934 for a period
of at least ninety (90) days and has filed all reports required
thereunder during the preceding year;
7. That the Company has represented to you that at the time of
its most recent annual report, there are currently one million
sixty-nine thousand (1,069,000) shares of the Company's issued
and outstanding common stock; and
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8. ThaJ; Mr. Goldberg is not an officer, director, employee or
affiliate of the Company and has not been an officer, director,
employee or affiliate for at least the preceding three (3)
months.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the information provided to
us, it is our opinion that Mr. Goldberg's holding of the Shares
meets the requirements of Rule 144 (k) of the Securities Act, and all
restrictions on the Shares should be lifted.
Very truly yours,

William R. Shupe
WRS/bk

(L\wrs\njtrnsfr.op2 3.9)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM
Record Reference
Complaint
Plaintiffs1 Notice of Election of Remedies

R. 1:2-18
R. 3:1208-11

Defendants' Objection and Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Notice of
Election of Remedies
R. 3:1288-99
Minute Entry Ruling Denying Defendants'
Objection to Election of Remedies and
Defendants' Motions in Limine
R. 4:1398
Transcript of Reading of Jury Verdict and
Court's Instructions regarding
Inconsistencies
Tr. XI:4826-37
Judgment of Rescission on Special Verdict of
the Jury (including findings of Jury Verdict)
R. 5:1923-36
Memorandum Decision (Denying Defendants' PostVerdict Motions)

R. 6:2532-38

Supplemental Judgment

R. 5:2165-67

Plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs

R. 5:2073-84

Defendants' Exhibits Pertaining to Cost
Award
R. 6:2267f 2287-2302
Order and Judgment (Awarding Costs)
Utah Statute on Punitive Damages Awards
Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1 (1992)
1989 Utah Laws 717 (ch. 237 - S.B. No. 24)
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FILED
DISTRICT COURT
JUL ZD

3 11 r». JU

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981)
JOANN SHIELDS (4664)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.)
INC, a Nevada corporation;
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah
corporation; and DAVID L.
ALLDREDGE, an individual,

COMPLAINT
(Demand for Jury Trial)

Plaintiffs,
vs.
11th AVENUE CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, f/k/a
SALT LAKE MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM;
and KEITH E. GARNER, an
individual,

civil NO.

MoMHtu£C(y

Defendants.

Plaintiffs claim against the Defendants and for causes of j
action allege:
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PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

Plaintiff Ong International (U.S.A.), Inc. ("Ong, Inc.")

is a Nevada corporation doing business in Salt Lake County, State !
!

of Utah.
2.

Plaintiff D&D Management ("D&D") is a Utah corporation *

with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.
3.

|
Plaintiff David L. Alldredge ("Alldredge") is a resident j

of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is an officer, director ;
and shareholder of D&D, and an officer of Ong, Inc.
4.

j

Defendant 11th Avenue Corporation is a Utah corporation, !

formerly known as Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum ( "SLMM") , with its j
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, j
5.

Defendant Keith E. Garner ("Garner") is a resident of j

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is or was an officer, \
director or shareholder of SLMM.
6.

Garner is the alter ego of SLMM and vice

7.

Subject matter jurisdiction of this action is present I

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1).

versa.

This Court has in !
i

personam
8.

jurisdiction.

j

Venue is properly laid in this Court pursuant to Utah j

Code Ann. § 78-13-1, 4 and 7.

I

210409B.PL2
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BACKGROUND ALLEGATIONS
The Construction of the Mausoleum Pavilion
9.

From at least 1984 through May 13, 1988, SLMM or its

predecessor-in-interest,
(collectively

"SLMM"),

Utah
operated

Memorial
and

Park

conducted

Mausoleum
a mausoleum

business located at 1001 East 11th Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah.
The business

included entombment

services

in the mausoleum

located at that address as well as crematory services.
10.

On or about April 30f 1984, SLMM, by and through its

agent, Arnold Fluckiger

("Fluckiger"), filed a Request for

Variance from the Terms of the Zoning Ordinance (the "Request")
with the Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, Utah, for the
construction of an outdoor garden mausoleum pavilion consisting
of five pods of concrete crypts containing 102 crypts per pod or
a total of 510 crypts (the "Pavilion").

Fluckiger was also the

architect retained by SLMM to design the Pavilion.

SLMM

represented in the documents and building plans submitted with
the Request that the individual crypts of the Pavilion would be
constructed of concrete.
11.

On or about May 14, 1984, the Board of Adjustment

granted the Request.
12.

The Findings and Order of the Board of Adjustment

specifically require that the construction plans conform to the

210409B.PL2
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requirements of the Uniform Building Code and all other Salt Lake
City ordinances applicable thereto and that SLMM comply with all
conditions imposed by the Board before a certificate of occupancy
or final inspection certificate would be issued.
13.

On or about July 10, 1984, SLMM, by and through its

agent, Robert M. Ord ("Ord"), filed a Building Permit Application
(the

"Application") with the Building and Housing Services

Department

of

Salt

Lake

City

Corporation

(the

"Building

Department"), for the construction of the Pavilion. Ord was also
the

general

Pavilion.

contractor

retained

by

SLMM

to

construct the

SLMM represented in the documents and building plans

submitted with the Application that the individual crypts of the
Pavilion would be constructed of concrete.
14.

On or about July 10, 1984, the Building Department

approved the Application and issued SLMM Building Permit No.
30641 for the construction of the Pavilion.
15.
August,

Construction of the Pavilion commenced in or about
1984,

but

was

not

completed

until

sometime

in

approximately 1987.
16.

On or about September 4, 1986, a Salt Lake City building

inspector inspected the construction of the Pavilion and cited
SLMM for a violation for the reason that individual crypts in the
Pavilion were constructed of wood rather than pre-fabricated or

210409B.PL2
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)

poured-in-place concrete as required by the zoning variance, the
building permit and the construction plans.
required

that

SLMM

obtain

the

approval

of

The citation
the

Salt Lake

City/County Board of Health for the construction and proposed use
of wooden crypts before a certificate of occupancy or final
inspection certificate would be issued.
17.

On or about September 4, 1986, the building inspector

filed a complaint with the Salt Lake City/County Board of Health
alleging that SLMM's construction and proposed use of wooden
crypts was in violation of the ordinances of Salt Lake City.
18.

On or about January 9, 1987, the building inspector

revoked the building permit previously issued, due in part to the
fact that SLMM had not received approval from the Board of Health
for the construction and proposed use of wooden crypts.
19.

Contrary to ordinances of Salt Lake City and the law,

SLMM and Garner or their agents, including Fluckiger and Ord,
subsequently completed construction of the Pavilion with crypts
constructed of either (1) all concrete, (2) all wood, or (3)
horizontal concrete surfaces and vertical wood surfaces.
20.

Salt Lake City has not issued a certificate of occupancy

or a final building inspection certificate relative to the
construction of the Pavilion.

The building permit initially

issued for the construction of the Pavilion is void.

210409B.PL2
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21.

Standards and practices in the mausoleum and crypt

construction industry dictate that crypts be constructed of
concrete, steel, stone or other materials not subject to decay
or leakage of corrosive materials or fluids. Said standards and
practices preclude crypts being constructed in whole or in part
of wood.
The Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum General Partnership Agreement
22.

On May 13, 1988, SLMM, Ong, Inc. and D&D entered into

a general partnership (the "Partnership") as memorialized in the
Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum General Partnership Agreement (the
"Partnership Agreement").
23.

The purpose of the Partnership was and is to operate,

develop, manage and conduct the business presently known as the
Salt Lake Mausoleum and Memorial Park.
24.
an

Pursuant to the Partnership Agreement, Ong, Inc. made

initial

Partnership.

capital

contribution

of

$800,000.00

to

the

SLMM contributed certain assets and liabilities

having an assigned net value of $875,000.00.

The assets and

liabilities contributed by SLMM were the business assets and real
property used in the mausoleum business including the Pavilion.
The Partnership Redemption Agreement.
25.

On or about February 28, 1989, the Partnership, SLMM,

Ong, Inc., D&D, Alldredge and Garner entered into a Partnership

210409B.PL2
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Redemption Agreement (the "Redemption Agreement").

26.

Pursuant to the terms of the Redemption Agreement, including the
specific representations and warranties of SLMM and Garner as
specified in paragraph 12 thereof, the Partnership purchased
SLMM's interest in the Partnership for $440,220.
27.

Subsequent to the parties entering into the Redemption

Agreement, Ong, Inc. has been required to make additional capital
contributions to the Partnership in excess of $500,000 to fund
obligations of the Partnership.
REPRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS
28.

During the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement and

the Redemption Agreement and as material inducements to the
Plaintiffs to enter into such Agreements, SLMM and Garner
represented to the Plaintiffs the following:
(a) The individual crypts in the Pavilion were of
standard

concrete construction, the

same standard concrete

construction as the "model crypt" in the indoor mausoleum of the
Partnership as shown to the Plaintiffs and potential third party
purchasers;
(b) The

individual

crypts

in

the

Pavilion

were

constructed as required by industry standards and practices;

210409B.PL2
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(c) The

individual

crypts

in

the

Pavilion

were

constructed as required by the zoning, building, health and other j
applicable ordinances of Salt Lake City.
(d)

SLMM and Garner were in the process of negotiating

with Salt Lake County to reduce SLMM's

real property tax

liability in the amount of $38,000.00.
29.

Each of the representations made by SLMM and Garner as

described in the preceding paragraph were false in that:
(a)

Substantially all of the crypts in the Pavilion are

constructed entirely or substantially of wood.
(b)

Industry

standards

and

practices

for

the

construction of mausoleum crypts require that the individual
crypts

be constructed

of

concrete, steel, stone

or other

materials not subject to decay or to leakage of corrosive
materials or fluids.
(c) The construction of the Pavilion is in violation
of the zoning, building, health and other applicable ordinances
of Salt Lake City.
(d)

SLMM

and

Garner were

not

in

the

process of

conducting and did not subsequently conduct any negotiations with
Salt Lake County which resulted in a reduction of SLMM's real
property tax liability. The Partnership was required to pay Salt

00003
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Lake County taxes, penalties and interest in the amount of
approximately $63f000.00.
30.

During the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement and \

the Redemption Agreement and as material inducements to the i
Plaintiffs to enter into such Agreement, SLMM and Garner omitted \
and otherwise failed to disclose to the Plaintiffs the following: i
(a) The building permit for the construction of the |
Pavilion had been revokedf the Certificate of Occupancy had not ;
been issued and Board of Health approval for the use of wooden j
crypts had not been obtained.

j

(b) Substantially all of the crypts in the Pavilion j
i

were constructed entirely or substantially of wood.

|

(c) The construction of wooden crypts is precluded by !
and in violation of industry standards and practices.
(d) The construction and proposed use of wooden crypts j
is in violation of the zoning, building, health and other
applicable ordinances of Salt Lake City.
31.

SLMM and Garner have never disclosed to the Plaintiffs

the facts alleged in the preceding paragraph, concealed such j
facts from the Plaintiffs and knew individual crypts in the j
Pavilion were not readily available

for inspection by the I

Plaintiffs.

210409B.PL2
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COUNT I

32.

RESCISSION

|

(Predicated On Constructive Fraud)

I

Plaintiffs

restate

and

incorporate

by

reference j

paragraphs 1 through 31, inclusive, of the Complaint.
33.

j

During the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement and ;

the Redemption Agreement, SLMM and Garner owed a fiduciary duty j
to the Plaintiffs and had a duty of good faith, fairness and j
honesty in dealing with the Plaintiffs due to the confidential j
relationship between the parties.
34.

As a general partner of the Partnership, SLMM owed a j

fiduciary duty to Ong, Inc. and D&D.

As the alter ego of SLMM,

Garner owed a fiduciary duty to Ong, Inc. and D&D.
35.

The representations of SLMM and Garner as alleged in

paragraph 28 and the failure to disclose facts as alleged in
paragraph 30 (hereinafter collectively the "Representations")
concerned presently existing facts.
36.
relative

The Representations were material to the Plaintiffs
to

their

respective

decisions

to enter

into the

Partnership Agreement and/or the Redemption Agreement.
37.

The

Representations

were

false

or

constituted

an

omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
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statements madef in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading.
38.

SLMM and Garner made the Representations for the purpose

of inducing the Plaintiffs to rely and act upon them and enter
into the Partnership Agreement and the Redemption Agreement.
39.

The Plaintiffs acted reasonably and in ignorance of the

falsity of the Representations.
40.

The

Plaintiffs

did,

in

fact,

rely

upon

the

Representations to their detriment and were thereby induced to
enter into the Partnership Agreement and the Redemption Agreement
to their injury and damage.
41.

The Partnership Agreement, the Redemption Agreement and

all ancillary agreements, releases, and waivers incident thereto,
are null, void and are of no force and effect whatever by reason
of Defendants' breach of fiduciary duties, misrepresentations and
omissions as aforesaid.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth in the
PRAYER FOR RELIEF.
COUNT II
RESCISSION
(Predicated On Frauds
42.

Plaintiffs

restate

and

incorporate

by

paragraphs 1 through 41, inclusive, of the Complaint.

210409B.PL2
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reference

")

43.

SLMM and Garner acted with scienter by intentionally

making the Representations knowing that the Representations were
false, or recklessly making the Representations knowing that they
had

insufficient

knowledge

upon

which

to

base

the

Representations.
44.

The Plaintiffs did, in fact, reasonably rely upon the

Representations to their detriment and were thereby induced to
enter into the Partnership Agreement and the Redemption Agreement
to their injury and damage.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth in the
PRAYER FOR RELIEF.
COUNT III
RESCISSION
(Predicated On Negligent Misrepresentation)
45.

Plaintiffs

restate

and

incorporate

by

reference

paragraphs 1 through 44, inclusive, of the Complaint.
46.
and

SLMM and Garner had a duty to use reasonable diligence

competence

in

ascertaining

the

veracity

of

the

Representations.
47.

SLMM and Garner breached their duty by making the

Representations to the Plaintiffs without having used reasonable
diligence or competence in ascertaining the veracity of the
Representations.

210409B.PL2
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48.

The

Plaintiffs

did,

in

fact,

rely

upon

the

Representations to their detriment and were thereby induced to
enter into the Partnership Agreement and Redemption Agreement to
their injury and damage.
49.

The injury and damage suffered by Plaintiffs were

proximately caused by the breach of SLMM and Garner of said duty.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth in the
PRAYER FOR RELIEF.
COUNT IV
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
50.

Plaintiffs

restate

and

incorporate

by

reference

paragraphs 1 through 49, inclusive, of the Complaint.
51.

SLMM

and Garner

breached

their

fiduciary

duty by

misrepresenting material existing facts and failing to disclose
material existing facts as alleged herein.
52.

The

Plaintiffs

did,

in

fact,

rely

upon

the

Representations to their detriment and were thereby induced to
enter into the Partnership Agreement and the Redemption Agreement
to their injury and damage.
53.

The

injury

and

damage

suffered

by

Plaintiffs was

proximately caused by the breach of SLMM and Garner of said duty.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth in the
PRAYER FOR RELIEF.
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COUNT V
CONVERSION
54.

Plaintiffs

restate

and

incorporate

by

reference

paragraphs 1 through 53, inclusive, of the Complaint
55.

During the term of the Partnership, SLMM and Garner

conveyed and transferred ownership of certain crypts to Garner
and approximately 12 third parties, for which the Partnership
received no consideration.
56.

Neither the Partnership, Ong, Inc. nor D&D knew of or

authorized said actions of SLMM or Garner in conveying and
transferring said crypts.
57.

The actions of SLMM and Garner as alleged in paragraphs

54 through 55 were intentional.
58.

The actions of SLMM and Garner as alleged in paragraphs

54 through 55 have damaged the Plaintiffs in an amount to be
proven at trial.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth in the
PRAYER FOR RELIEF.
COUNT VI
INDEMNIFICATION
59.

Plaintiffs

restate

and

incorporate

by

paragraphs 1 through 58, inclusive, of the Complaint.
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60 • Pursuant to the terms of the Redemption Agreement, SLMM
agreed

to

indemnify

the

Partnership

from

all

demands,

liabilities, losses, damages including attorneys' fees and costs
which the Partnership may sustain by virtue of acts which were
done or omitted to be done by SLMM, prior to the date of the
Redemption Agreement.
61.

SLMM and Garner knew or should have known that the

Partnership would sell and market crypts in the Pavilion to the
general public.
62.

SLMM and Garner knew or should have known that when it

was discovered by purchasers of crypts in the Pavilion that the
crypts were constructed of wood and in violation of the zoning,
building, health and other applicable ordinances of Salt Lake
City, claims would be made against the Partnership and the
Plaintiffs relative thereto.
63.

On information and belief such claims will be made for

which indemnification is sought.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the relief set forth in the
PRAYER FOR RELIEF.

210409B.PL2
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiffs pray for the following relief:
1.

On Counts

I, II, and

III, for rescission of the i

Partnership Agreement, the Redemption Agreement and all ancillary
agreements, releases, and waivers incident thereto, and for
restoration of Plaintiffs to their status quo prior to entering ;
into the Agreements, including judgment against the Defendants j
for damages in an amount to be proven at trial to fully and
completely restore Plaintiffs to their status
2.

quo

ante.

In the alternative, on Counts I through VI inclusive,

for an award of compensatory damages in an amount to be proven
at trial but not less than $2.5 Million Dollars.

j

I
3.
On all Counts, for indemnification of the Plaintiffs by
the Defendants from any claim, demand, cause of action or !
liability

as

the

result

of

Plaintiffs' involvement

i

in or I

ownership of the Partnership or the mausoleum business conducted j
by the Partnership, including the sale of crypts in the Pavilion, j
i

4.

For punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial I

of not less than $5 Million Dollars.
5.

!
I
For reasonable attorney's fees and costs in prosecuting j
I

this action as proven at trial for all counts and causes of j
action.

j

210409B.PL2
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I

6.

For such further and additional relief as the Court

deems equitable in the premises.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury of all issues triable of right,
common law and the Utah Constitution.
DATED this jlsft day of July, 1990.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

S^Z?^
ROBERTAS. CAMPBELL ^ ^

CLSRK W. SESSIONS^
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Plaintiff's Address:
1001 East 11th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah

00018
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DlSTP.iOt COURT

AUG

a 10 23 R« f91

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981)
JOANN SHIELDS (4664)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.)
INC, a Nevada corporation;
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah
corporation; and DAVID L.
ALLDREDGE, an individual,

PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF
ELECTION OF REMEDIES

Plaintiffs,
vs.

11th AVENUE CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, f/k/a
SALT LAKE MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM;
KEITH E. GARNER, an
individual;

Civil No. 900904288CN
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record herewith
give Notice to the Defendants of their determination with regard
to remedies as to each of the Defendants.
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The Plaintiffs Ong International

(U.S.A.), Inc., D & D

Management, Inc., and David L. Alldredge herewith elect their
remedies against the Defendants as follows:
1.

Against Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum, now called 11th

Avenue Corporation, or against its alter-ego Keith E. Garner for
rescission,

consequential

damages

and

punitive

damages

in

accordance with the law of the case arising out of fraudulent
misrepresentations of the Defendants;
2.

Against Keith E. Garner, an individual, and inducer of

the fraudulent misrepresentations for fraud, for direct benefit
of the bargain damages, consequential damages and punitive
damages;
3.

Against Keith E. Garner and 11th Avenue Corporation for

breach of fiduciary duties in the performance of the partnership,
the damages thereof being the reasonable and natural injuries
that are foreseeable arising from said breaches;
4.

Against Keith E. Garner for conversion, embezzlement

and misappropriation of partnership assets and properties, the
damages being the fair market value of said assets to the
partnership together with punitive damages.
5.

Although

not

a

matter

of

remedies,

against

the

Defendants Keith E. Garner and/or 11th Avenue Corporation, for
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. -easonable attorneys fees and costs as to each of the
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DATED this 4**"

lip

Law.

day of August, 1991.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

CLARK W. SESSIONS

_

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the c$~7% day of August, 1991, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF
ELECTION OF REMEDIES was hand-delivered to:
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq.
Gary A. Weston, Esq.
John K. Mangum, Esq.
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Defendants
60 East South Temple, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Arthur H. Nielsen, USB No. A2405
Gary A. Weston, USB No. 3435
Richard M. Hymas, USB No. 1612
John K. Mangum, USB No. 2072
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Attorneys for Defendants

Thir0<Jycliciai District
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SA

LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.)
)
INC., a Nevada corporation; !>&;
MANAGEMENT, a Utah corporatirand DAVID L. ALLDREDGE, an
individual,

DEFENDANTS1 OBJECTION AND
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS1 NOTICE OF
ELECTION OF REMEDIES

Plaint i i; ;._,
Civil No
11th AVENUE CORPORATION, a til ai
corporation, fka SALT LAKE
MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM; and KEITH
E. GARNER, an individual,

I udq<'

900904288CN

! „ 1 ipnii i s L'rede i i ck

Defendants.

c

'

»

_^a_-Liif£.'

Objec

.\'c::^

r

•

.

* lectior

Meuio: a n d u m

-PP{^ *

* Remedies.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
B

Relevant Business Dealings Between the Parties

Fro-

Corporal: .i

-

M

- • .-

*the Howard W. Hunter
. -»Law Library, J.*
^ Clark ,
\- BYU.
,
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Mausoleum [lfSLMMM ], operated and conducted a mausoleum business
at 1001 East 11th Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah.
E. Garner

Defendant Keith

["Garner"] isf and at all relevant times wasf an

officer, a director, and a shareholder of SLMM.

[Complaint at

119.]
On May 13, 1988, SLMM, Plaintiff Ong International (U.S.A.),
Inc. ["Ong, Inc."], and Plaintiff D&D Management ["D&D"] entered
into a general partnership [the "Partnership"] as memorialized in
the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum General Partnership Agreement
[the "Partnership Agreement"].

The purpose of the Partnership

was to operate, develop, manage and conduct
business.

the mausoleum

[Complaint at if if 22-23.]

On or about February 28, 1989, the Partnership, SLMM, Ong,
Inc., D&D, Plaintiff David L. Alldredge ["Alldredge"] and Garner
entered into a Partnership Redemption Agreement [the "Redemption
Agreement"].

Alldredge is an officer, director and owner of D&D,

and an officer of Ong, Inc.

Pursuant to the terms of the

Redemption Agreement, the Partnership purchased SLMM's interest
in the Partnership.
B.

[Complaint at 1fIf 3, 25-26.]

Nature of the Lawsuit

On July 25, 1990, Plaintiffs commenced this action against
Defendants.

Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that Garner is

the alter ego of SLMM, and vice versa.

[Complaint at 116.] They

further allege that SLMM and Garner made false representations,
and failed to make complete disclosure, regarding the materials
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Claims for Relief
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fraud.
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misrepresentation.
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B r e a c h o1 fiduciary d 1 11 y

COU!

C o n v e r s ion

COUIIL
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Th^

f.= t; four

counts

of; P l a i n t i f f s 1

constructive

.--^1 igent

complaint

based

upoi i the alleged r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a n d omissions referred tu a b o v e .
2m

Prayer for Rel ief

P l a i n t i f f s ' P r a y e r f o r R e I i e f s e e k s , in f M I f , i he?

following

relief:
1.
O n C o u n t s 1/ I I , a n d I I I , for rescission of
the P a r t n e r s h i p A g r e e m e n t , t h e R e d e m p t i o n A g r e e m e n t a n d
all ancillary agreements, released, and waivers
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incident thereto, and for resoration of Plaintiffs to
their status quo prior to entering into the Agreements,
including judgment against the Defendants for damages
in an amount to be proven at trial to fully and
completely restore Plaintiffs to their status quo ante.
2.
In the alternative, on Counts I through VI
inclusive, for an award of compensatory damages in an
amount to be proven at trial but not less than $2.5
Million Dollars.
C.

Order Requiring Defendants To Make Election Of Remedies

At the pre-trial conference held on July 29, 1991, the Court
ordered Plaintiffs to make and give notice to Defendants of their
election of remedies.

On August 5, 1991, Defendants received

Plaintiffs' Notice of Election of Remedies, which provides in
pertinent part:
The Plaintiffs Ong International (U.S.A.), Inc.,
D&D Management, Inc., and David L. Alldredge herewith
elect their remedies against the Defendants as follows:
1.
Against Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum, now
called 11th Avenue Corporation, or against its alterego Keith E. Garner for rescission, consequential
damages and punitive damages in accordance with the law
of the case arising out of fraudulent misrepresentations of the Defendants;
2.
Against Keith E. Garner, an individual, and
inducer of the fraudulent misrepresentations for fraud,
for direct benefit of the bargain damages, consequential damages and punitive damages;
3.
Against Keith E. Garner and 11th Avenue
Corporation for breach of fiduciary duties in the
performance of the partnership, the damages thereof
being the reasonable and natural injuries that are
foreseeable arising from said breaches;
[Emphasis added.]
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Defendants' Stipulation.
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ARGUMENT
I
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED PROPERLY
ELECT THEIR REMEDIES WHERE THEIR NOTICE
SETS FORTH AN INTENT TO PORSOE THE INCONSISTENT
REMEDIES OF RESCISSION AND DAMAGES
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Plaintiffs1 Notice of Election of Remedies indicates that
Plaintiffs have elected to pursue the remedy of rescission
against SLMM and Garner.

It also indicates that Plaintiffs seek

to recover damages against Garner for fraud and for breach of
fiduciary duty.
and inconsistent

The election by Plaintiffs of two alternative
remedies—rescission and damages—is not an

appropriate or adequate election of remedies.
It is well-established that the remedies of rescission and
damages for fraud are inconsistent.

Gentemann v. Sunaire

Systems, 665 P.2d 875, 877 (Or.App. 1983).

Rescission, on the

one hand, is a restitutionary remedy which attempts to restore
the parties to the status quo to the extent possible or as
demanded by the equities in the case.

Dugan v. Jones, 724 P. 2d

955, 957 (Utah 1986); Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d
716, 731 (Utah App. 1990).

On the other hand, damages in an

action for fraud are determined under

the

"benefit of the

bargain" rule, which provides for damages in an amount equal to
the difference between the value of :he property purchased and
the value it would have had if the representations were true.
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980).

1

Damages for breach of fiduciary duty, like damages for
fraud, are not designed to restore a plaintiff to the status quo,
but instead attempt to compensate the plaintiff for the damages
which proximately result from the defendant's tortious conduct.
Such damages are inconsistent with the remedy of rescission, and,
where rescission is sought, are precluded under the doctrine of
election of remedies.
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n
claims against the corporate defendant were for rescission of two
instruments which he had been induced to sign by reason of the
fraudulent representations of the individual defendant.

The

plaintiff also sought to recover "damages" from the individual
defendant in an amount equal to the consideration paid by him in
the transaction.

Meredith, at 943.

The issue in the case was

whether the plaintiff was foreclosed from recovering "damages"
from the individual defendant under the doctrine of election of
remedies where his claim against the corporate defendant was for
rescission.
The court in Meredith acknowledged that the plaintiff cannot
have two satisfactions for the same injury.

The court noted,

however, that the corporate defendant had been out of business
for some time and had no assets, and thus could not restore the
plaintiff

to

transaction.

the position

he had

been

in prior

to

the

In view of the plaintiff's inability to obtain

satisfaction from the corporate defendant for his injury, the
court ruled, it would not be a violation of the doctrine of
election of remedies for the plaintiff to recover "damages" from
the individual defendant.

As stated by the court:

The rescission of a contract for fraud does not
prevent a recovery of damages from one who participated
in the fraud but was not a party to the contract. At
least such is the rule where the complaining party has
"failed to obtain satisfaction" "either by a
restoration or recovery of the consideration or
otherwise." 24 Am.Jur. p. 39, §211.
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[ T ] he p.1 a i nt i f f f s r e s c i s s i on or a11empt r -J * e s c i nc _..c o n t r a c t on account of the fraud d o e s not d e f e a t h i s
r i g h t t o r e c o v e r damages from a t h i r d p a r t y s o long a s
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It should be observed that a defrauded party may
proceed against the principal and the agent, seeking
rescission against the principal ai id damages against
the agent who procured the execution of the contract.
Such defrauded party can have one satisfaction, and
fai1 i ng to obtain restitution either wholly or par11y
from the principal, may recover from the agent such sum
as will constitute restoration to status quo.
Such
will constitute the damages recoverable against the
agent.
Meredith, 384 P. 2d at: 94 6 (emphasis added),
Ladd Bi >3 the is , -l -Ill I1" V I J ">

II

See also

POJDOV

II )

In McAllister v. Charter First Mortgage, Inc.f 5 6? P.2d 539,

• ;'."•
elect ic - i r remedies doctr.ne carted
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:i.

* argument that the
^ i

i damages against
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contract.
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The Court went on to state that the measure ct iamages
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

against the fraudulent inducer is not the benefit of the bargain,
but rather, "the extent to which the rescission decree has failed
to restore the status quo (because of [the contracting party's]
insolvency or otherwise)•"

McAllister, 567 P.2d at 543 (emphasis

added).
Similarly, in Strout Realty, Inc. v. Burghoff, 718 S.W.2d
469 (Ark. App. 1986), another case relied upon by Plaintiffs, the
court ruled that the inducer of the fraud could properly be held
liable for restitutionary damages, even though the plaintiffs had
elected to rescind the contract in question.

Id. at 471.

The cases cited by Plaintiffs support the proposition that,
in an action seeking to obtain a judgment of rescission against a
corporation who was a party to a contract, based upon a claim of
fraudulent inducement, the inducer of the fraud may be held
liable for "damages" for whatever restitution the corporation is
unable to pay.

See, e.g. , Meredith v. Ramsdell, 384 P.2d 941,

946 (Colo. 1963).

Such damages do not include "benefit of the

bargain" damages or other amounts intended to compensate the
plaintiffs for the damages proximately caused by the defendant's
conduct.
The issue of whether Utah law will allow Plaintiffs to seek
"damages" from Garner for any restitution obligation SLMM is
required, but unable, to pay need not be determined by the Court.
That issue is rendered moot by reason of Garner's agreement that
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Arthur H. Nielsen
^
Gary A. Weston
Richard M . Hymas
John K. Mangum
of NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C,
Counsel for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this
upon

Plaintiffs

/
U

A

" day of August, 1991f I served

a true and correct

copy of the foregoing

Defendants1 Objection and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs1
Notice of Election of Remediesf by causing the same to be handdelivered to the following:
Robert S. Campbell, Jr.
Clark W. Sessions
Dean C. Andreasen
Campbell Maack & Sessions
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

RMH.-PLDG: 13604. GA750. 20
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
ALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
01 1G INTERNftTION;

INC. , et
al,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY RULING

vs.

11TH AVENUE CORPORATION, et al,
Defendant ,

CASE !T~

:-oo90-;;?3

The Court having reviewed the pleadings submitted rules as
follows:
Defendants' obj ection to plaintiffs' Notice ?f Elect ion
of Remedies is denied for the reasons set forth
; plainti £: :•'
Trial Brief, points II and III.
2. Defendants' first Motion in Limine is denied for the
i: easons set forth in plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition thereto.
, Defendants7 second Motion in Limine is denied for the
reasons set forth in plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition. Title
78-18-1 et.seq. U.C.A., effective May 1, 1989 is not applicable,
the events i nvolved in the instant proceeding having occured
prior to said effective date, and the statutory scheme having
prospective application only. Expert opinions if pertinent and
helpful to the trier of fact will be allowed if proper foundation
i s laid.
.-.:miffs' Motion ii i Limine is denied as to witness Mary
D. Taylor for the reasons specified in defendants' memorandum in
opposition. As to the balance of the listed fact witnesses the
motion is taken under advisement. The testimony of expert
witness Harry Arneson will be limited to that given in his
deposition only.
, Plaintiffs' Motion to Substitute Expert Witness is
granted under certain terms and conditions relayed to counse. .n
the telephone conference August 6, 1991.
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THE COURT:

I understand we have a verdict in this

matter,
MR. CAMPBELL:

That's what I understand, your

Honor.
(Whereupon, the jury entered the courtroom.)
THE COURT:

You may be seated.

In this matter the record may show that all jurors
are now present and in place, that the parties and counsel
are present.
Ladies and gentlemen, I'm Judge Sawaya taking Judge
Frederick's place for the purpose of this part of the proceeding.

It's the Court's understanding that you have a

verdict.
Have you reached a verdict in this matter?
MS. THOMAS:
THE COURT:
MS. THOMAS:
THE COURT:
MS. THOMAS:
THE COURT:

Yes.
And I assume —

I don't know your name.

Linda Thomas.
Are you forelady of this panel?
Yes.
Would you hand the verdict forms to the

Bailiff so that he can bring them to the Clerk, please?
The Special Verdict and the Interrogatories all
seem to be answered.

I don't know what effect they'll have,

but I will ask the Clerk to read the Special Verdict answers.
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THE CLERK:

Ong International (U.S.A,) Inc., a

Nevada corporation; D & D Management, a Utah corporation; and
David L. Alldredgey an individual, v. 11th Avenue Corporation , a Utah corporation, f/k/a Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum,
Keith E. Garner, an individual.

Special Verdict of the Jury,

Case No. 900904288.
We the jury, duly impaneled in the above-entitled
action, find the issues of fact and return our special
verdict as follows:

I.

Claims of Ong International, U.S.A.

Inc., and D & D Management against SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and
Garner:

1.

Did SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner

commit fraud, as that term is defined in the Court's Instructions, against Ong International and D & D Management in the
sale of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum under the Purchase
Agreement dated May 13, 1988 and the Redemption Agreement
dated February 28, 1989?
Answer:
2.

Yes.

Did SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner

commit constructive fraud as defined in the Court's Instructions, against Ong International and D & D Management in the
sale of Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum under the Purchase
Agreement dated May 13, 1988 and the Redemption Agreement
dated February 28,1989?
Answer:

No.

Did SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner
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negligently misrepresent, as that term is defined in the
Court's Instructions, to Ong International and D & D Management the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum properties and assets
in the sale under the Partnership Agreement dated May 13,
1988 and the Redemption Agreement dated February 28, 1989?
Answer:

Yes.

If your answer is yes to any of the questions 1, 2
or 3 above, then the Court, as part of the judgment entered
on the Special Verdict, will order a rescission of the
Partnership Agreement and the Redemption Agreement, including
releases in accordance with these instructions.
II.

Claims of Ong International against Keith E.

Garner, individually:

Did Keith E. Garner, acting as an

individual, commit fraud, as that term is defined in the
Court's Instructions, against Ong International in the sale
of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum under the Partnership
Agreement dated May 13, 1988 and the Redemption Agreement
dated February 28,1989?
Answer:

Yes.

Did Keith E. Garner, acting as an individual,
commit constructive fraud, as that term is defined in the
Court's Instructions, against Ong International in the sale
of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum under the Partnership
Agreement dated May 13, 1988 and the Redemption Agreement
dated February 28, 1989?
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Answer:

No.

Did Keith E. Garner, acting as an individual,
negligently misrepresent, as that term is defined in the
Court's Instructions, to Ong International the sale of the
Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum under the Partnership Agreement
dated May 13, 1988 and the Redemption Agreement dated
February 28, 1989?
Answer:
III.

Yes.

Claims of Ong International for breach of one

or more fiduciary duties:

Did SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and

Keith E. Garner breach a fiduciary duty as a partner to Ong
International in the course of the performance of the
Partnership Agreement between the date of the Partnership
Agreement, May 13, 1988, and the date of the Redemption
Agreement, February 28,1989?
Answer:

Yes.

Did Keith E. Garner convert partnership assets to
his own use or purposes during the term of the partnership
between May 13, 1988 and February 28, 1989?
Answer:

No.

If, under Section I or II above, you have answered
yes to any of the questions 1, 2 or 3, then you should
proceed to answer the questions under Section IV.

If you

have not so answered the questions under Sections I and II,
then you should now proceed directly to Section V.
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Section IV.

Damages to Ong caused by fraud,

constructive fraud or negligent misrepresentations of SLMM/
11th Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner, and as to Keith E.
Garner, individually:

If you have answered yes to any of the

questions 1, 2 or 3 of Section I or II, then answer this
question.
Fraud damages as to Keith E. Garner:

What was the

difference between the fair market value of the corporate
assets of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum as represented at
the time of the Partnership and Redemption Agreements and the
fair market value of said corporate assets in the condition
it was actually in as of the same dates?
$400,047 —
numbers.

no, $447,000.

I'll just read the

Four four seven comma zero three four.
Consequential damages:

What are the amount of

consequential damages, as defined in the Court's Instructions, which Ong International has sustained as a result of
the fraud, constructive fraud, or negligent misrepresentation
by SLMM/11th Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner?
$1,165,022.
Answer the following question only if you have
determined that SLMM/11th Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner,
or Keith E. Garner, individually, committed fraud upon Ong
International.
C.

Punitive damages:

1.

Should SLMM/11th Avenue
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Corp. and Keith E. Garner pay punitive damages to Ong International in consequence of the fraudulent misconduct?
Answer:
a.

Yes.

If you have answered yes to this question, what

is the amount of punitive damages that SLMM/llth Avenue Corp.
and Keith E. Garner should pay to Ong International?
$1,800,000.
If you have answered yes to question 1 or 2 under
Section III, then proceed to Section V.

If you have answered

no to question 1 of Section III, then proceed no further,
sign your Special Verdict as instructed, and notify the
Bailiff that you are ready to return to open court.
V.

Damages to Ong International for breach of

fiduciary duty:

1.

What are the damages which Ong Inter-

national has sustained as a consequence of the SLMM/llth
Avenue Corp.'s breach of fiduciary duties in the course of
the performance of the Partnership Agreement?
Answer:
2.

$70,000.

What are the damages sustained by Ong Inter-

national as a natural and direct consequence of the conversion of assets by Keith E. Garner?
Answer:

$512,098.

Dated this 26th day of August, 1991, Linda Thomas,
Foreperson of the Jury.
THE COURT:

Gentlemen, do you have any questions
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with regard to the verdict as it's been read by the Clerk?
Mr. Campbell?
MR. CAMPBELL:

Your Honor, the Plaintiff doesn't

have any questions at this time.
THE COURT:

Would you request that the jury be

polled with regard to their verdict?
MR. CAMPBELL:

No, we don't, your Honor, but we

have no objection of that being done.
THE COURT:
MR. MANGUM:

Counsel?
Yes, your Honor, Defendants do have a

question, particularly with regard to the last answer read as
it relates to question number 2 of Section III, and if we
might have a bench conference on that matter.
THE COURT:

Section III, claims of Ong Inter-

national for breach of one or more fiduciary duties?

Is that

the one?
MR. MANGUM:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.
Subsection or subquestion 2, did

Keith E. Garner convert partnership assets to his own use or
purposes during the term of the partnership —

is that how it

starts?
MR. MANGUM:
THE COURT:

Yes.
The answer to that was no and you have

some question about that?
MR. MANGUM:

Well, the question I have, your
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Honor

—
MR. CAMPBELL:

I think we ought to confer at the

bench.
MR. WESTON:

If we could approach the bench, your

Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

(Whereupon, discussion was held at the bench out of
the hearing of the jury and the Reporter.)
THE COURT:

Ladies and gentlemen, there's a bit of

confusion with regard to the verdict that has been read,
particularly with Section III and question number 2 to that
particular question and interrogatory.
to you and I'll inquire of —
MS. THOMAS:
THE COURT:

Let me just read it

your name again?

I'm sorry.

Linda Thomas.
Linda Thomas.

Thank you.

Ms. Thomas, as the foreperson of the jury, I'm
going to direct this question to you so that I don't need to
go through everyone.

Roman numeral III is entitled Claims of

Ong International for breach of one or more fiduciary duties,
and with particular attention to question number 2 under that
heading, the question was, did Keith E. Garner convert partnership assets to his own use or purposes during the term of
the partnership between May 13, 1988 and February 28, 1989?
You have answered that no.
intended to

Is that the answer to which you

—
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MS. THOMAS:
THE COURT:

Yes, it is.
—

reply?

Subsequently you awarded damages for that particular breach and that's the inconsistency that we need to
resolve.
My question to you, did the jury unanimously intend
to answer subparagraph 2 to paragraph Roman numeral III, did
you intend to answer that no?
MS. THOMAS:

We did and we took that only as the

actual transferring of property which is why we answered no.
THE COURT:

If you answered that no, then it is my

understanding that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover
damages for that breach.
MS. THOMAS:

Do you understand that?

I do, I understand what you're saying.

We did not take it into consideration as being total fiduciary responsibilities.

We only took it into consideration as

being crypts.
THE COURT:

And yet you assessed damages for that

breach.
MS. THOMAS:
THE COURT:

Yes, we did.
Did you understand that the Plaintiff

cannot recover those damages even though you assessed them?
MS. THOMAS:

No, we did not.

so we do have an error in there.

We figured he could,

Do you want us to go back

in and discuss it?
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THE COURT:

Would you like to go in and correct

this error as you see it?
MS. THOMAS:

Yes, I do think that would be

appropriate.
THE COURT:

Counsel, do you feel that would be the

way to handle it?
MR. CAMPBELL:
THE COURT:

We do, your Honor.

Let me send you out again for the time

that it will take you to correct the verdict and as you
correct it, will you initial what you correct?
MS. THOMAS:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir, I will.
All right.

(Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.)
THE COURT:

I don't think we need to recess.

My

expectation is that it won't take but a moment.
MR. CAMPBELL:

Right.

(Whereupon, after a period of time, the jury
entered the courtroom.)
THE COURT:

You may be seated.

The record may again show that all jurors are now
present and in place, parties and counsel are present, and
Ms. Thomas, have you made the corrections on the verdict form
that you intended to make?
MS. THOMAS:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Is that by majority vote?
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1

MS. THOMAS:

2

THE COURT:

3

Yes.
And unanimous vote of the members of

the jury?

4

MS. THOMAS:

Yes, it was.

5

THE COURT:

6

Counsel, the verdict form has been amended by the

You can bring that up.

7

members of the panel with regard to Roman numeral III,

8

question number 2.

9

no to yes, and I'll ask, Ms. Thomas, is that the amendment

10

The answer to that has been changed from

and the correction that you intended to make?

11

MS. THOMAS:

12

THE COURT:

13

Yes, it was.
Is that a correction based on the fact

that you made a mistake in marking the answer no previously?

14

MS. THOMAS:

15

Am I not answering your question?

16

THE COURT:

17

We did discuss it in full.

I'm not sure that you did.

again.

18

MS. THOMAS:

19

MR. CAMPBELL:

20

THE COURT:

21
22
23

Try it

What was your question again?
It's hard to hear.

Is it hard to hear?

I'm so soft-spoken

in my old age.
Ms. Thomas, that answer now is yes.

Is that the

answer that you and the panel intended to give previously?

24

MS. THOMAS:

25

THE COURT:

Yes, we believe it was.
And based on further deliberation and
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discussion in the jury room, you've determined that you had
marked the wrong answer?
MS. THOMAS:
THE COURT:

Is that what happened?

Yes, that is correct.
Now, you have marked the answer as yes

and initialled it; is that correct?
MS. THOMAS:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir, I did.
Counsel, is that satisfying you?

MR. CAMPBELL:

Are there any other changes, your

Honor?
THE COURT:
MS. THOMAS:
THE COURT:

Are there any other changes?
No, sir, there are not.
All right, the damage portion in Roman

numeral V indicating the damages for that breach are
$512,098.

Is that to remain unchanged?
MS. THOMAS:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir, that's correct.
All right, now, Counsel, do you want

the jury polled with regard to any of these answers?
MR. MANGUM:

Yes, your Honor, counsel for Defend-

ants would as to all answers.
THE COURT:

Do you want them polled on each

question?
MR. WESTON:

Yes, your Honor, we do with regard to

the affirmative answers.
THE COURT:

A simple way of doing that is just to

read each question and ask whether there were any members of
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SUL-

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981)
JOANN SHIELDS (4664)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.)
INC., a Nevada corporation;
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah
corporation; and DAVID L.
ALLDREDGE, an individual,

fllU^bga.

JUDGMENT AND DECREE
OF RESCISSION ON
SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiffs,
OF THE JURY
vs.
11th AVENUE CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, f/k/a
SALT LAKE MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM;
KEITH E. GARNER, an
individual,

Civil No. 900904288 CN
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on
the merits of plaintiffs' claims against the defendants before the
Court, the HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, District Judge presiding, on Thursday, August 8, 1991, the plaintiffs being represented
by their counsel, Robert S. Campbell, Jr. and Clark W. Sessions of
Campbell Maack & Sessions of Salt Lake City, and the defendants
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being represented by their attorneys, Arthur H. Nielsen, Gary A.
Weston and John K. Mangum of Nielsen & Senior of Salt Lake City.
The Court proceeded to impanel a jury of eight (8) men
and women, along with two alternates, to try the issues of fact
under plaintiffs1 complaint, opening statements of counsel were
thereupon made and

evidence

in. the form of sworn

testimony,

exhibits and stipulations were submitted by the parties, respectively, and received by the Court on the days of August 8, 9, 13,
14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, and 23, 1991. On Friday, August 23, 1991,
the Court instructed the Jury as to the law to be applied to the
facts and closing summations were thereafter made by counsel
whereupon at the approximate hour of 4:30 p.m. on said date, one
juror having been dismissed by stipulation and the first alternate
having been seated with the second alternate dismissed, the case
was submitted to and the Jury retired under the charge of a sworn
officer to deliberate on the issues under the Special Verdict Of
The Jury.
After due deliberation, the Jury returned into open
Court its Special Verdict on Monday, August 26, 1991, as follows:
SPECIAL VERDICT OF THE JURY
"We the Jury, duly impaneled in the above-entitled
action find the issues of fact and return our special
verdict as follows:
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CLAIMS OF ONG INTERNATIONAL, (U.S.A.), INC. AND D&D
MANAGEMENT AGAINST SLMM/11TH AVENUE CORP. AND GARNER:
1.

Did SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner
commit fraud, as that term is defined in the
Court's Instructions, against Ong International
and D&D Management in the sale of the Salt Lake
Memorial Mausoleum under the Purchase Agreement
dated May 13, 1988 and the Redemption Agreement
dated February 28, 1989?
Yes

X

No
2.

Did SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner
commit constructive fraud as defined in the
Court's Instructions, against Ong International
and D&D Management in the sale of the Salt Lake
Memorial Mausoleum under the Purchase Agreement
dated May 13, 1988 and the Redemption Agreement
dated February 28, 1989?
Yes
No

3.

X

Did SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner
negligently misrepresent, as that term is
defined in the Court's Instructions, to Ong
International and D&D Management the Salt Lake
Memorial Mausoleum properties and assets in the
sale under the Partnership Agreement dated May
13, 1988 and the Redemption Agreement dated
February 28, 1989?
Yes

X

No
If your answer is "Yes" to any of the questions 1, 2, or
3 above, then the Court, as part of the judgment entered
on the Special Verdict, will order a rescission of the
Partnership Agreement and the Redemption Agreement,
including releases in accordance with these Instructions.
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II.

CLAIMS OF ONG INTERNATIONAL AGAINST KEITH E. GARNER,
INDIVIDUALLY;
1.

Did Keith E. Garner, acting as an individual,
commit fraud, as that term is defined in the
Court's Instructions, against Ong International in
the sale of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum under
the Partnership Agreement dated May 13, 1988 and
the Redemption Agreement dated February 28, 1989?
Yes

X

No
2.

Did Keith E. Garner, acting as an individual,
commit constructive fraud, as that term is defined
in the Court's Instructions, against Ong International in the sale of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum under the Partnership Agreement dated May 13,
1988 and the Redemption Agreement dated February
28, 1989?
Yes
No

3.

X

Did Keith E. Garner, acting as an individual,
negligently misrepresent, as that term is defined
in the Court's Instructions, to Ong International
the sale of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum under
the Partnership Agreement dated May 13, 1988 and
the Redemption Agreement dated February 28, 1989?
Yes

X

No
III. CLAIMS OF ONG INTERNATIONAL FOR BREACH OF ONE OR MORE
FIDUCIARY DUTIES:
1.

Did SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner
breach a fiduciary duty as a partner to Ong International in the course of the performance of the
Partnership Agreement between the date of the
Partnership Agreement, May 13, 1988 and the date of
the Redemption Agreement, February 28, 1989?
Yes
No
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2.

Did Keith E. Garner convert partnership assets to
his own use or purposes during the term of the
Partnership between May 13, 1988 and February 28,
1989?
Yes

X_

No
If, under Section 1 or II above, you have answered "Yes"
to any of the questions 1, 2 or 3, then you should
proceed to answer the questions under Section IV. If
you have not so answered the questions under Sections I
and II, then you should now proceed directly to Section
V.
DAMAGES TO ONG CAUSED BY FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD OR
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS OF SLMM/ 11TH AVENUE CORP,
AND KEITH E. GARNER, AND AS TO KEITH E. GARNER, INDIVIDUALLY;
If you have answered "Yes" to any of the questions 1, 2
or 3 of Section I or II, then answer this question.
A.

Fraud Damages as to Keith E. Garner:
1.

What was the difference between the fair
market value of the corporate assets of the
Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum as represented
at the time of the Partnership and Redemption Agreements and the fair market value
of said corporate assets in the condition
it was actually in as of the same dates?
$447,034

B.

Consequential Damages:
1.

What are the amount of consequential damages, as defined in the Court's Instructions,
which Ong International has sustained as a
result of the fraud, constructive fraud, or
negligent misrepresentation by SLMM/llth
Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner.
$1,165,022

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

Answer the following question only if you have determined that SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner,
or Keith E. Garner, individually, committed fraud upon
Ong International.
C.

Punitive Damages:
1.

Should SLMM/llth Avenue Corp. and Keith E.
Garner pay punitive damages to Ong International in consequent of the fraudulent
misconduct?
Yes

X

No
a.

If you have answered "Yes" to this
question, what is the amount of
punitive damages that
SLMM/llth
Avenue Corp. and Keith E. Garner
should pay to Ong International?
$1,800,000

If you have answered "Yes" to question 1 or 2 under
Section III, then proceed to Section V.
If you have
answered "No" to question 1 of Section III, then proceed
no further, sign your Special Verdict as instructed, and
notify the Bailiff that you are ready to return to open
Court.
DAMAGES TO ONG INTERNATIONAL FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY
DUTY;
1.

What are the damages which Ong International
has sustained as a consequence of the SLMM/llth
Avenue Corp. f s breach of fiduciary duty[ies] in
the course of the performance of the Partnership Agreement?
$70,000

2.

What are the damages sustained by Ong International as a natural and direct consequence of
the conversion of assets by Keith E. Garner?
$512,098

DATED this 26th day of August, 1991.
S/ Linda Thomas
THE BYU.
JURY
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At the request of the defendants, the Court polled the

| Jury as to their answers to the Special Verdict and determined
|| that each of the questions were answered by unanimous vote of the
i Jury and upon further inquiry of counsel having determined that
ij all questions under the Special Verdict were answered, the Court
i; received the Special Verdict, discharged the Jury from service and
ordered that the Special Verdict be filed with the Clerk.
And

the Court, upon review of the Jury's Special

ii
: I

i| Verdict, having concluded that several of the questions thereunder
, were submitted based upon alternative theories of recovery and
i that in light of the Jury's Special Verdict on several of the
j| issues, recovery on other alternative issues will not be further
|i pursued by plaintiffs or granted by the Court; and the Court

11
j having now considered all and singular the law appertaining in the
•j matter and having concluded that a decree of rescission and damage
Ij judgment should be accordingly entered upon the Special Verdict of
;j the Jury,
i

| NOW THEREFORE, upon motion of plaintiffs, good cause appearing,
i

11 IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
i!
!!

ii
Ij I.
jj
|j 1.
i
|j

COUNT II - RESCISSION AND ANCILLARY DAMAGES AND RELIEF
PREDICATED ON FRAUD •
Under Count II of plaintiff's Complaint against 11th
Avenue Corporation and Keith E. Garner for fraudulent
misrepresentations against both defendants as determined
by the Jury in its Special Verdict in the sale of inter-
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ests

in

the

Salt

Lake

Memorial

Mausoleum

under

the

Partnership Agreement dated May 13, 1988, and the Redemption Agreement dated February 28, 1989, said Agreements in
their

entireties

as

to

all

parties,

along

with

all

individual Releases incident thereto, BE AND THE SAME ARE
HEREBY RESCINDED, SET ASIDE AND DECLARED VOID AB INITIO,
AND OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT.
As an inherent part of said Rescission, 11th Avenue
Corporation and Keith E. Garner jointly and severally be
and they are hereby ORDERED to pay over and remit to Ong
International, Inc., within twenty-four (24) hours of the
entry hereof, the sum of One Million Two Hundred Forty
Thousand Two Hundred Twenty Dollars ($1,240,220.00), paid
by Ong

International, Inc. to purchase the Salt Lake

Memorial Mausoleum Partnership under the Partnership and
Redemption Agreements. Simultaneously, Ong International
and D&D Management be and they are hereby ORDERED to set
over and convey to 11th Avenue Corporation and Keith E.
Garner all right, title and interests previously purchased
in and to the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum Partnership
inclusive of the four (4) Skyway Heights lots and all
assets and liabilities of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum.
To the end of effectuating this Order, in the event
that 11th Avenue Corporation and Keith E. Garner fail to
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pay over and remit said sum at the time of transfer and
conveyance set out above of the Mausoleum Partnership and
properties, in addition to all other remedies available to
Ong International, it shall have JUDGMENT against 11th
Avenue and Keith E. Garner jointly and severally as of the
date of transfer and conveyance

for the sum Ordered,

namely One Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Two Hundred
Twenty Dollars ($1,240,220.00), together with interest
thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from
and after the date of entry until the total of such sum is
paid and satisfied as by law provided,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all necessary documents to
forthwith effect the payment to Ong International and the
transfer hereunder to 11th Avenue Corporation and Keith E.
Garner

shall be forthwith

executed

by the

respective

parties;
2.

For further relief under Count II and pursuant to the
Special Verdict of the Jury, JUDGMENT BE AND THE SAME IS
HEREBY ENTERED in favor of Ong International, Inc. and
against

11th Avenue Corporation

and

Keith E. Garner,

jointly and severally, for consequential damages as a
result of the fraud in the sum of One Million One Hundred
Sixty-Five Thousand Twenty-Two Dollars ($1,165,022.00),
together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from and after the date of entry
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until the total of such sum is paid and satisfied as by
law provided;
Under Count II and Paragraph 4 of Ong International's
Prayer of

the Complaint

and

pursuant

to the

Special

Verdict of the Jury, JUDGMENT BE AND THE SAME IS HEREBY
ENTERED

against

11th Avenue Corporation

and Keith E.

Garner, jointly and severally, for punitive damages as a
result of the fraud

in the sum of One Million Eight

Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,800,000.00), together with
interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from and after the date of entry until the total of
such sum is paid and satisfied as by law provided.
COUNT VI -

ANCILLARY RELIEF OF INDEMNIFICATION

Under Count VI and as an ancillary aspect of the relief
under Count

II of

plaintiffs1

Complaint,

11th Avenue

Corporation, Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum Partnership and
Keith E. Garner jointly and severally be and the same are
HEREBY ORDERED TO INDEMNIFY AND HOLD HARMLESS Ong International, Inc., D&D Management and David L. Alldredge from
and against any and all claims, demands, liabilities,
losses, and damages of third parties against the Salt Lake
Memorial Mausoleum Partnership, its partners or David L.
Alldredge, which may have arisen or developed before or
during the Partnership up to the date of reconveyance to
11th

Avenue

Corporation

and

Keith

E.
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of

the

Partnership interests pursuant to Paragraph I hereof, and
which are hereafter made regarding the sale or marketing
of wooden crypts or other conduct determined as fraudulent
by the Jury under its Special Verdict incident to the
Partnership or Redemption Agreements or the operation of
the Partnership between May 13, 1988 and February 28,
1989.
III.

COUNT III - RESCISSION AND DAMAGES PREDICATED ON NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION.
Under Count III of plaintiffs' Complaint, the Jury determined in its Special Verdict that 11th Avenue Corporation
and Keith E. Garner both as the alter ego of the Corporation and individually, made negligent misrepresentations
in the Partnership Agreement dated May 13, 1988 and the
Redemption Agreement dated February 28, 1989.

The Court

has determined that the relief of Rescission and compensatory damages under Count III is the same and duplicative
of that under Count II of plaintiffs1 Complaint and that
as a matter of law, no additional compensable damages may
be recovered

by Ong

International,

Inc. against

11th

Avenue Corporation or Keith E. Garner, either individually
or as the alter ego of 11th Avenue Corporation.

Accord-

ingly, JUDGMENT BE AND THE SAME IS HEREBY ENTERED in favor
of

Ong

International,

Inc.

and

against

11th

Avenue

Corporation and Keith E. Garner, jointly and severally for
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negligent misrepresentation with no additional relief or
compensable damages beyond that set forth in this Decree
and Judgment under Paragraph I, subparagraphs 1 and 2
immediately preceding.
IV.

COUNT II -

FRAUD AGAINST GARNER, INDIVIDUALLY.

Under Count II of plaintiffs' Complaint, pursuant to the
Jury's

Special

Verdict

finding

fraud

as

to Keith E.

Garner, individually, JUDGMENT BE AND THE SAME IS HEREBY
ENTERED in favor of Ong International and against Keith E.
Garner, an individual, in the sum and amount of Four
Hundred

Forty-Seven

Thousand

Thirty-Four

Dollars

($447,034.00) and punitive damages of One Million Eight
Hundred

Thousand

Dollars

($1,800,000.00);

Provided

However, that this Paragraph IV shall be and is enforceable only to the extent that it ensures recovery by Ong
International of the restitutional damages (purchase price
and consequential damages) awarded to it under Paragraph
I of this Decree and Judgment.

It shall not be enforced

in addition to or independently

of

the

consequential

damages and punitive damages under Paragraph I.
V.

COUNT I -

CONSTRUCTIVE FRAUD.

Under Count I of plaintiffs' Complaint, the Jury having
found no constructive fraud under the Special Verdict as
to 11th Avenue Corporation and Keith E. Garner or Keith E.
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Garner, individually, said Count be and the same is hereby
dismissed with prejudice.
VI.

COUNTS IV AND V -

BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND CONVERSION.

Under the breach of fiduciary duty and conversion allegations of Counts IV and V of plaintiffs1 Complaint, even
though the Jury found under its Special Verdict in favor
of Ong International and against 11th Avenue Corporation
and

Keith

E. Garner

on

both

Counts, because

of

the

potential inconsistencies of recovery under said Counts
with Rescission and consequential damages under Paragraph
I of this Decree and Judgment, Ong International has moved
to dismiss voluntarily said Counts IV and V and accordingly,

said

Counts

be and

the

same

are dismissed

with

prejudice.
VII.

CERTAIN CLAIMS OF DAVID L. ALLDREDGE AND D&D MANAGEMENT,
The claims of the plaintiffs David L. Alldredge and D&D
Management, except for their claims for rescission and
indemnification, be and the same are hereby dismissed with
prejudice.

VIII. ATTORNEYS FEES.
The claim of the plaintiff Ong International, Inc. for
attorneys fees was bifurcated pursuant to the parties'
pretrial stipulation for separate hearing and determination following the verdict of the Jury.

In light of the

rescission relief and accompanying damages entered in this
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Decree and Judgment and pursuant to stipulation of the
parties, the Court concluded that the recovery of attorneys fees by the prevailing party is unavailable under
controlling law.

Accordingly, the claims of all parties

to recovery of attorneys fees are dismissed with prejudice, each of the parties to pay and discharge their own
attorneys fees.
IX,

COSTS AND EXPENSES.
Plaintiffs are awarded their costs and expenses of suit in
the matter.

DATED this

ii

J£

day of September, 1991.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
I CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

ROBERT S. CI
CLARK W. SESSIONS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
NIELSEN & SENIOR

ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
GARY A. WESTON
JOHN K. MANGUM
Attorneys for Defendants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAI/ DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 017 UTAH

ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.)
INC., a Nevada corporation;
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah
corporation; and DAVID L.
ALLDREDGE, an individual,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

900904288

Plaintiffs,
vs.
11th AVENUE CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation, fka SALT LAKE
MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM; AND KEITH
E. GARNER, an individual,
Defendants.

The

defendants

having

filed

their

Notice

to

Submit

for

Decision in the instant proceeding related to their Motions for
Judgment

N.O.V.,

Award, and

New Trial

or Remittitur

for Stay of Execution

of

Punitive

Damage

(filed September 26, 1991),

being herewith fully advised in the premises, now therefore the
Court rules as follows:
1.
denied•

Defendants'

conditional

The Memoranda

sufficiently

request
set

for

hearing

forth the
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is

respective

i

ONG INT. V. 11TH AVENUE

positions

of

the

PAGE TWO

parties.

Oral

MEMORANDUM DECISION

argument

accordingly

is

not

is denied

for

deemed necessary.
2.

Defendants' Motion

for Judgment N.O.V.

the reasons set forth in plaintiffs'

Memorandum in opposition

thereto.
3.

Defendants'

Motion

Punitive Damage Award

for

New

is denied

Trial

or

Remittitur

of

for the reasons specified

in

plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition thereto.
4.

Defendant's

September

26,

Motion

1991

is

for

denied

Stay

for

of

the

Execution

reasons

set

filed

forth

in

plaintiff's Memoranda in opposition thereto.
5.
in

Defendants' requests

part

founded

(insufficiency
Procedure
passion

on

of

59(a)(5)

Utah

the

for new trial or remittitur are

Rules

evidence)

(excessive

or prejudice) .

of

This

Civil

and

Utah

damages

Court

Procedure
Rules

under

59(a)(6)
of

Civil

influence

is of the view

that

of
the

award of punitive damages was warranted by the evidence which
was sufficient to support a lawful jury finding of defendant
Garner's requisite mental state for the reasons delineated
plaintiffs'

Memorandum

in

opposition

to

plaintiffs'

in

Motion.

Moreover, the amount of punitives awarded, $1,800,000.00, when
compared

to

the

actual

damages

resultant
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from

defendant
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Garner's

PAGE THREE

conduct,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

$1,165,022.00

consequential,

and

$1,240,220.00 for rescission (which is an award necessitated by
Garner's

fraud),

approximately

for

a

1:1-1/2.

total

of

There

is

$2,405,242,
a

reasonable

relationship of punitives to actual damages.
falls

within

Exchange,

the

164

eliminating

rationale

Utah

the

Adv.

necessity

of

Crookston

Rep.
of

3

this

the

Court

and

Fire

Court

will

articulate

its

28,
to

views

rational

Insurance

1991),

give

with

thus

a detailed

explanation for its decision in affirming the award.
this

is

This ratio range

v.

(June

ratio

regard

However,
to

the

so-called "seven factors11 as follows:

A.

Relative wealth of the defendant:

at trial that he
317.

Garner acknowledged

is a multi-millionaire, cf. , Exhibits 91 &

Certain of Garner's assets were misrepresented at trial

which misrepresentation
Garner
awarded

testified
the

divorce.

on

LaJolla,

When

was

established

direct

examination

California

confronted

by

with

cross-examination.

that

residence
the

his
in

original

wife

was

their

1982

divorce

file

showing Garner was awarded the property, his original statement
was retracted.
B.

Nature

misconduct

was

of

alleged

fraudulent

misconduct:
concealment

The

defendants'

and/or

affirmative
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misrepresentation

of
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the

MEMORANDUM DECISION

classical

type.

He

falsely

represented the plywood crypts as concrete, for which Ong paid
$1,240,220.00.

After the misrepresentation came to light, the

crypts were expertly appraised as worthless property having a
negative value.
C
The

Facts

facts

and

and

circumstances

circumstances

surrounding

surrounding

the

the

misconduct:

fraud

show

that

over a period of three to four years, Garner misrepresented the
nature of the plywood crypts to everyone necessary to advance
his

fraud,

including

inspectors, his
could

own

customers,

staff

sell the mausoleum

insurance

and his partners.
and

escape

the

arguing

building

He believed

consequences

fraud through the general release of claims.
no contrition

agents,

he

of his

Garner has shown

for his acts; on the contrary, he persists in

that he cannot understand

the dispute because wooden

crypts ought to be good enough for anyone.
D.

Effect

uncompensated

on

the

lives

loss

the

Garner

of plaintiffs
defendants

and

have

others:
caused

The

to Ong

through the time, money and resources devoted by Ong to this
case is tremendous.

But even as egregious, is the effect on

the lives of the hundreds of crypt owners who believed they had
purchased cement rather than plywood crypts for themselves and
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loved ones.

PAGE FIVE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

This case presents a serious fraud on the public

as well as Ong.

Moreover the influence peddling aspects of the

case show Garner's continued willingness to traffic in and play
upon people's trust and confidence in their religious leaders
and in his religious stature.
E.

Probability of future recurrence:

It is impossible to

tell what Garner defendants may do with the crypts after they
retake possession
attempt

to

fill

of them.
the

crypts

It

is

with

supposed
those

they will

who

seem

either

to have no

objection, or bring the crypts up to concrete standard.
punitive

damage

award

will

likely

deter

Garner

from

The

further

fraud in connection with the mausoleum and might even silence
the references to the L.D.S. Church

in future sales pitches.

Furthermore, the well-established basis for punitive damages is
punishment as well as deterrence.

Synergetics v. Marathon, 701

P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985), at 1112.
F.
parties
invoking

Relationship of the parties:
was,
a

as

the

fiduciary

jury

found,

relationship

The relationship of the

that
that

of

general

requires

partners

dealing with

the highest level of openness, trust and confidence.

Garner's

fraud was in part committed against people with whom he stood
in the highest fiduciary relationship of trust.
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G.

Amount

resultant

of

from

($1,165,022.00

PAGE SIX

actual

Garner's

MEMORANDUM DECISION

damages:

misconduct

The

amount

consequential, $1,240,220.00

actual
to

damages

$2,405,242.00.

rescission).

When

compared to the punitive damage award of $1,800,000.00, results
in

a

ratio

of

approximately

1:1-1/2.

The

actual

damages

supports the punitive damages award.
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in
plaintiff's
Judgment

opposing

N.O.V.,

Memoranda,

New Trial

defendants'

or Remittitur

of

Motions
Punitive

for
Damage

Award, and for Stay of Execution are denied.
Defendant's

Supplemental

Motion

Concerning

Bond

During

Pendency of Post Judgment Motions and Any Appeal (filed October
17, 1991) will be ruled on upon timely receipt of request for
decision per Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration.
Counsel for plaintiff's to prepare an appropriate Order.
Dated this

November, 1991.

DERICK
0/JRT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of

the

this

foregoing

Memorandum

Decision,

to

the

following,

_day of November, 1991:

Robert S. Campbell
Clark W. Sessions
Dean C. Andreasen
Joann Shields
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
201 S. Main Street, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215
Arthur H. Nielsen
John K. Mangum
Attorneys for Defendant
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.)
INC, a Nevada corporation;
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah
corporation; and DAVID L.
ALLDREDGE, an individual,

SUPPLEMENTAL
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
11th AVENUE CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, f/k/a
SALT LAKE MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM;
KEITH E. GARNER, an
individual;

Civil No. 900904288CN
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
pursuant to notice before this Court, the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick,

District

Judge

presiding,

on

the

26th

day of

September, 1991 at the Metropolitan Hall of Justice in Salt Lake
City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

The Plaintiffs appeared

through and were represented by their attorneys, Robert S.
Campbell, Jr., Clark W. Sessions of Campbell Maack & Sessions and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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n

the Defendants appeared by and through Gary A. Weston and John K.
Mangum of Nielsen & Senior.

The Court heard and considered the

Defendants' objections to the form of Judgment proposed by
Plaintiffs including the arguments and statements of counsel and
memoranda filed by the respective parties.
The Court further heard and considered the Application of
Plaintiffs for a Supplemental Judgment for costs and expenses
incurred in the operation of the Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum for
the

period

August

through

September,

1991,

including

the

arguments and statements of counsel and an Affidavit of David M.
Traveler, marked and received as Exhibit Supplemental P-l and
being fully advised in the premises, now therefore,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Ong International
(U.S.A.) Inc.f a Nevada corporation be and the same shall have
Judgment against 11th Avenue Corporation, a Utah Corporation
f/k/a

Salt Lake Memorial Mausoleum and Keith E. Garner, an

individual, jointly and severally, in the sum of $29,648.00
together with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from
and after the date of entry until the total of such sum is paid
and satisfied as by law provided.
DATED this

Qi^day of

(V>k|

1991.

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.
CLARK W. SESSIONS

DEAN C. ANDREASEN

NIELSEN & SENIOR

ARTHUR H. NIELSEF
GARY A. WESTON
JOHN K. MANGUM
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
SALT ..
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981)
7
BY_
T^
?!.
JOANN SHIELDS (4664)
L-:,-.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.)
INC, a Nevada corporation;
DSD MANAGEMENT, a Utah
corporation; and DAVID L.
ALLDREDGE, an individual,

JZ/&^6-^^L
VERIFIED MEMORANDUM
OF COSTS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
11th AVENUE CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, f/k/a
SALT LAKE MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM;
KEITH E. GARNER, an
individual;

Civil No. 900904288CN
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

Pursuant

to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, Plaintiff Ong International (U.S.A.), Inc. (MOngM), by
and through its counsel of record, submits this Verified Memorandum
of Costs in the amount of $27,737.85 incurred in obtaining its
$4,205,242.00 Judgment against the defendants Keith E. Garner and
11th Avenue Corporation.
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ITEMIZATION OF COSTS
The costs Ong seeks to recover in this action are
summarized as follows:
1.

Filing Fees

$

125.00

2.

Witness Fees

$

768.75

3.

Deposition Fees

$11,588.60

4.

Travel for Depositions

$ 2,079.44

5.

Photocopies

$ 8,918.91

6.

Photograph Fees

$ 1,692.72

7.

Exhibits

$ 2,564.43
Total

$27,737.85

Detail for each of the above-stated categories is attached hereto.

DATED t h i s ^ ^ ^ d a y of October 1991.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

ROBERT S.
DEAN C. ANDREASEN
Attorneys for Ong International
(U.S.A.), Inc.
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
DEAN C. ANDREASEN, being first duly sworn on oath,!
deposes and states that:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of i

Utah and am one of the attorneys retained by Plaintiffs in this i
action.
2.

I have reviewed the accounting records maintained by;

Campbell Maack & Sessions with respect to its representation of the j
Plaintiffs in this action and, in particular, the records relating!
to costs and expenses disbursed on behalf of Plaintiffs.
3.

:

Pursuant to my review and to my knowledge, the items ,
i

stated herein are current, and the costs and disbursements have;
been necessarily incurred in this action.
i

DEAN C. ANDREASEN
Subscribed and sworn to before me this cS^^t
October 1991.
•&/*f / ^

NOTARYvJPUBLIC
Residing at:
My. CommjLssJ.Qn_Expj.res:
;

-• •.•:. :~i'^

'1 • ; • - •
<

'"•-,.;

> V
''

KAThLuE;.' f- L O G ;

Septs:r,;-.
-JlN.ViPCr-

•:•
. .

:
'"

; ;

.
•:.
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I
day of:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by
the law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, 170 South Main Street,
Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that in said capacity and
pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that on
the^J^t^/ day of October 1991 I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Plaintiff's Verified Memorandum of Costs to be handdelivered to the following:
Arthur H. Nielsen
Gary A. Weston
John K. Mangum
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
<JX>^

^ ^ 7 ^ ^ ? ^
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FILING FEES
DATE

PAYEE

AMOUNT

7-20-90

Third District Court

$

125-00

$

125.00

TOTAL
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WITNESS FEES
DATE

PAYEE

AMOUNT

8-23-90

Marion Hanks

$

18.00

8-23-90

Arnold Fluckiger

$

18.00

8-23-90

Robert Ord

$

18.00

8-23-90

Keith Garner

$

18.00

10-17-90

Roger Evans

$

18.00

10-17-90

Kim Ekker

$

19.00

10-17-90

Dennis Lucero

$

20.00

10-17-90

Richard Ith

$

19.00

11-15-90

David Brockbank

$

20.00

11-19-90

Steve Nielsen

$

28.00

2-25-91

Sherman F. Anderson

$

19.00

3-18-91

Marion D. Hanks

$

18.00

3-18-91

Robert Ord

$

18.00

3-18-91

Arnold Fluckiger

$

18.00

3-18-91

Keith Garner

$

18.00

3-18-91

Susan Stewart

$

20.00

3-18-91

Steve Neilsen

$

27.00

3-18-91

Sandra Lenois

$

18.00

3-25-91

Eugene Kimball

$

17.00

4-2-91

Burtis Evans, M.D.

$

18.00

4-2-91

Nielsen & Senior

$

110.00

6-6-91

Alan Funk

$

17.00

6-6-91

Lawrence Reaveley

S

17.75
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7-26-91

James 0. Cummings

$

17.00

7-26-91

Lynne Godfrey

$

17.00

7-26-91

Carol Bennett

$

17.00

7-26-91

Clemens B. Waltz

$

17.00

7-26-91

Eugene Kimball

$

17.00

7-26-91

Dennis Lucero

$

17.00

7-26-91

Sandra Lenois

$

17.00

7-26-91

Marion Hanks

$

17.00

7-26-91

Arnold Fluckiger

$

17.00

7-26-91

Steve Neilson

$

32.00

7-26-91

Roger Evans

$

17.00

8-21-91

Brento Pack

$ .

18.00

$_
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768.75

DEPOSITION FEES
DATE

PAYEE

AMOUNT

9-28-90

Merit Reporters

$

325.50

10-08-90

Merit Reporters

$

344.05

10-24-90

Merit Reporters

$

319.20

10-26-90

Merit Reporters

$

132.85

11-12-90

Merit Reporters

$

226.50

11-15-90

Merit Reporters

$

396.45

11-26-90

Merit Reporters

$ 1 ,589.50

12-13-90

Merit Reporters

$

242.15

12-19-90

Associated Professional Report

$

551.10

12-31-90

Merit Reporters

$

210.50

1-18-91

Merit Reporters

$

308.80

2-20-91

Merit Reporters

$

255.20

2-26-91

Merit Reporters

$

362.55

3-05-91

Kathleen Monaghan

$

115.20

3-06-91

Merit Reporters

$

274.05

3-12-91

Merit Reporters

$

363.00

3-20-91

Merit Reporters

$

291.20

4-05-91

Merit Reporters

$

182.20

4-23-91

Merit Reporters

$

887.60

4-25-91

Merit Reporters

$

341.95

4-30-91

Merit Reporters

$

471.35

5-07-91

Merit Reporters

$

293.00

5-10-91

Merit Reporters

$

177.70
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5-13-91

Merit Reporters

~<u..-K.4 2fl.nn

6-28-91

Merit Reporters

$

622.15

7-01-91

Merit Reporters

$

166.90

7-09-91

Merit Reporters

$

917.20

7-11-91

Merit Reporters

$

60.10

7-15-91

Merit Reporters

$

253.75

7-17-91

Norman E. Mark

$

545.30

7-17-91

Merit Reporters

$

116.90

8-15-91

Merit Reporters

$

93.20

8-26-91

Anna M. Bennett

$ _

12.50

TOTAL
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$11 ,588.60

TRAVEL FOR DEPOSITIONS
DATE
2-19-91

7-10-91

PAYEE

AMOUNT

American Express
Air Fare

$

808.00

Meals/Lodging

$

89.03

Travel Expense

$

22.00

Parking

$

6.00

$

1,072.00

American Express
Air Fare
Meals/Lodging
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$_

82.41

$_

2,079.44

i

PHOTOGRAPH FEES

DATE

PAYEE

AMOUNT

12/07/90

Howells One-Hour Photo

08/01/91

Howells Photo Service

677.34

08/02/91

Howells Photography

920.55

Total

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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$

94.83

$1,692.72

a

)

EXHIBITS

DATE

PAYEE

AMOUNT

07/25/91

Reuels

08/02/91

Reuels

08/08/91

Jensen Reproductions

204.00

08/14/91

Jensen Reproductions

246.23

08/15/91

Jensen Reproductions

69.06

08/16/91

Jensen Reproductions

52.59

08/20/91

Jensen Reproductions

1,216.83

09/09/91

Executive Presentation
Systems

$

37.23
74.43

Total

664.06

$1 ,564.43

i
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Arthur H. Nielsen (A2405)
Gary A. Weston (3435)
John K. Mangum (2072)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
60 East South Temple
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No. (801) 532-1900

.v^rH'Sl
,iOi

c

r J&-. £>

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ONG
INTERNATIONAL
(U.S.A.)
INC., a Nevada corporation; D&D
MANAGEMENT, a Utah corporation;
and DAVID L. ALLDREDGE, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,

11th AVENUE CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, f/k/a SALT LAKE
MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM; and KEITH
E. GARNER, an individual,

MEMORANDUM
OF
POINTS
AND
AUTHORITIES
IN
SUPPORT
OF
MOTION OF DEFENDANTS TO TAX
COSTS

Civil No. 900904288CN
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.

Defendants,
respectfully

by

and

through

submit

the

following

their

undersigned

Memorandum

of

counsel,

Points

and

Authorities in Support of the Motion of Defendants of even date
herewith for the court to tax the costs in this action.

10840
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EXHIBIT B

EXHIBIT -B"
DEPOSITION
FEES

PAYMENT
9-28-90

10-08-90

10-24-90

10-26-90

DATE

PAYEE/DESCRIPTION
Merit Reporters
Depo of Arnold
Taken 9/24/90

11-15-90

11-26-90

12-13-90

I

12-19-90

12-31-90

FLuckiger
$

325 . 50

Merit Reporters
Depo of Robert Ord, Vol.
Taken 10/1/90

$

344 . 05

Merit Reporters
Depo of Robert Ord, Vol. I I
Taken 10/17/90

$

319.20

$

132.85

$

226 . 50

$

396.45

Merit
Depo

Taken
1 1 -12-90

AMOUNT

Reporters
of Marion

D.

Hanks

10/16/90

Merit Reporters
Depo of David Alldredge
Taken 11/2/90
Merit

Reporters

Trans .

D e p o of B r i a n ( K i m ) E k k e r
Taken 11/8/90 Depo of Roger Evans
Taken 11/8/90 Merit Reporters
Depo of Sandra Lenois
Taken 11/11/90 Depo of David Brockbank
Taken 11/1/90 Depo of Richard Ith
Taken 11/16/90 Depo of Dennis Lucero
Taken 11/16/90 Depo of Steven Nietson
Taken 11/21/90 Merit Reporters
Depo of Keith Garner, V. II
Taken 12/5/90
Associated Professional Report
Depo of Keith Garner, Vol. I
Taken 10/29/90

Exs .

$208.05

+

$0.40

$182.20

+

$0.80

$346.70

+

$4.60

$344.35

+

$0.40

$273.85

+

$0.80

Postage
$2.50
$2.50

$ 3.30
$ 3.30
$ 3.30
$ 3.30

$222.15

+

$1.60

$363.15

+

15.40

$ 3.30

Merit Reporters
Depo of David Alldredge, V . II
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$ 1 , 589. 50

$

242 . 15

$

551.10

$

210.50

1-18-91

2-20-91

2-26-91

3-5-91

3-6-91

3-12-91

3-20-91

4-05-91

4-23-91

4-25-91

Merit Reporters
Depo of Jeri Stevens, Vol. I
Taken 1/8/91
Depo of Jeri Stevens, Vol. II
Taken 1/9/91 Depo of Monty Stevens
Taken 1/9/91 Merit Reporters
Depo of Lynne Godfrey
Taken 2/7/91
Merit Reporters
Depo of Susan
Taken 2/20/91

$232.10
$ 49.50

+

$20.80

+

6.40

308 . 80

255.20

Stewart
362 . 55

Kathleen Monaghan
Depo of James Milne
Taken 2/13/91
Merit Reporters
Depo of Sherman Anderson
Taken 2/28/91 Depo of Clem Waltz
Taken 2/28/91 Merit Reporters
Depo of Ong Ka Thai
Taken 9/18/89

115.20

$164.55

+

104.60

+

$1.95
$

274.05

$

363.00

Merit Reporters
Depo of Ong Ka Thai
Taken 3/14/91

$

291.20

Merit Reporters
Depo of Gene Kimball
Taken 3/27/91

$

182.00

Merit Reporters
Depo of Sherman Anderson, V. II
Taken 4/18/91 $231 . 50
Copies of Depos of William Lang
Taken 4/15/91, 6/28/91, and
7/1/91 $423.00
and Charles Foote Taken 4/18/91
and 6/28/91 $216.50
Merit Reporters
Depo of Dell Jean Cook
Taken 4/19/91

$1.00

$1.95

$ 9 . 60

CD

ro
ro
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2 . 40
4 . 60

$

887.60

$

341.95

4-30-91

5-07-91

5-10-91

5-13-91

6-28-91

7-01-91

7-09-91

\

7-11-91

:>

Merit Reporters
D e p o of B u r t i s E v a n s
T a k e n 4/25/91 C o p i e s of D e p o s of C r a m e r
Stiff taken 4/23/91 and D a v i d A L L d r e d g e , V. Ill
T a k e n 4/26/91 Merit Reporters
ZX C o n v e r s i o n s
D e p o of G e r a l d N e w t o n
T a k e n 4/29/91
D e p o of D a v i d A L L d r e d g e , V . I V
T a k e n 5/1/91
Merit Reporters
D e p o of D r . H e r b e r t
T a k e n 5/6/91

Merit Reporters
D e p o of D e n n i s S t r o n g
T a k e n 6/19/91
D e p o of S t a n l e y S n a r r
T a k e n 6/20/91
D e p o of L. R e a v e l e y
T a k e n 6/25/91

+

$1.40

$ 97.90

+

2.20

$1.95
471 . 3 5

$

293.00

$

177.70

$175.00
$ 59.70
$ 58.30

$ 66.00

$

2 . 00

$ 68.20

$ 2.80

$139.00

$142.90
$161.05

+

$303 . 30

+

$
$ 8.00

+

3.00

$3.90

$622.15

$166.90

$246 . 55

+

$3.20

$3.75

$131.65

+

$2.00

$ 3.75

$122.25

+

$0.00

$3.75

$141.05

+

$2.20

$ 3.75

$ 71.50

+

$5.60

$ 85.80

+

$5.40

I I
I I
$917.20

D espa i n
$

)
5

$

W iIc o x e n

Merit Reporters
Depo of A l a n Funk
T a k e n 7/1/91
D e p o of V i r g i l K o v a l e n k o
T a k e n 7/3/91
D e p o of B r e n t P a c k
T a k e n 7/3/91
D e p o of Al L a n d v a t t e r
T a k e n 7/3/91
D e p o of C h a r l e s F o o t e , V
T a k e n 6/28/91
D e p o of W i l l i a m L a n g , V.
T a k e n 6/28/91
Merit
Reporters
D e p o of C h e r y l
T a k e n 7/1/91

$148.50

Schroeder

Merit Reporters
D e p o of C a r o l B e n n e t t
T a k e n 5/7/91
D e p o of J a m e s C u m m i n g s
T a k e n 5/7/91

Merit Reporters
D e p o of R o b e r t
T a k e n 6/26/91

$1.95

$217.45
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60.10

7-15-91

7-17-91

7-17-91

8-15-91

8-26-91

Merit R e p o r t e r s
Depo of Ed A n d r u s
Taken 7/2/91

$

253.75

N o r m a n E. Mark
Depo of H a r r y A r n e s o n
Taken 7/5/91

$

545.30

$

116.90

$

93.20

$

12.50

Merit Reporters
D e p o of M a x i n e
T a k e n 7/9/91

Hanks

Merit Reporters
Depo of G r a n t C a l d w e l l
Taken 8/14/91
Anna M. B e n n e t t
T r a n s c r i p t of T r i a l P r o f f e r
t e s t i m o n y of H e r b e r t
Schroeder

of

TOTAL:

ro
ID
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981)
JOANN SHIELDS (4664)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.)
INC, a Nevada corporation;
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah
corporation; and DAVID L.
ALLDREDGE, an individual,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
11th AVENUE CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, f/k/a
SALT LAKE MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM;
KEITH E. GARNER, an
individual;
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

AMENDED
NOTICE OF DEPOSITIONS

Civil No. 900904288CN
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiffs' counsel, Robert S.
Campbell, Jr. and Clark W. Sessions of Campbell Maack & Sessions,
will be taking the depositions of Keith E. Garner, Arnold
Fluckiger, Robert M. Ord, and-Marion D. Hanks at the offices of
Campbell Maack & Sessions, 170 South Main Street, Suite 400, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101 on the following dates:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Name

-Date and Time

Keith E. Garner
(individually and as
president of 11th Ave,
Corporation)

October 18, 1990
10:00 a.m.

Arnold Fluckiqer

September 24, 1990
10:00 a.m.

Robert M. Ord

October lf 1990
10:00 a.m.

Marion D. Hanks

October 16, 1990
10:00 a.m.

Said depositions will be before a Certified Shorthand
Reporter and will be upon oral interrogatories pursuant to Rule
30 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this ..''/%

day of September, 1990.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

f\

/

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.
CLARK W. SESSIONS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
the

for^

day of September, 1990,

foregoing AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITIONS was served on

Defendants by mailing a true and correct copy thereof to:
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq.
John K. Mangum, Eaq.
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Defendants
60 East South Temple, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981)
JOANN SHIELDS (4664)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.)
INC, a Nevada corporation;
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah
corporation; and DAVID L.
ALLDREDGE, an individual,

DISCOVERY CERTIFICATE

Plaintiffs,
vs.
11th AVENUE CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, f/k/a
SALT LAKE MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM;
KEITH E. GARNER, an
individual;

Civil No. 900904288CN
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of September, 1990,
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO THE DEFENDANTS and
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS were
served on Defendants by hand-delivering true and correct copies
of the same to Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq. and John K. Mangum, Esq.,

14

210409f.PL3
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Nielsen & Senior, Attorneys for Defendants, 60 East South Temple,
#1100, Salt Lake City, Utah.
DATED this 10th day of September, 1990.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
A

(i
. '\/'/<„-

i

f

/ ,i

,<~/.re/:ts:

^,1

DEAN C . ANDREASEN

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of September, 1990, a
true and correct of the foregoing DISCOVERY CERTIFICATE was handdelivered to:
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq.
John K. Mangum, Esq.
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Defendants
60 East South Temple, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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EXHIBIT "Ew
Schedule of Deposition Fees
Claimed by Plaintiffs
As Grouped by Defendants

Reporter fee not attributable to this
case. Fee for deposition of M. Norman 626, mistakenly included on invoice 4526B
dated July 3, 1991

$

85.00

Reporter
fee
for
computer
disc
conversions to ZX format invoice dated
May 7, 1991, from Merit Reporters (part
of payment made by Plaintiffs on May 7,
1991)

$

175.00

Court reporter fee to Anna Bennett on
August 26, 1991, for copy of Defendants'
proffer
regarding
testimony
of
Dr.
Herbert Schroeder

$

12.50

Reporter fees for copies of deposition
transcripts for depositions taken only at
request of Defendants
a. 1989 deposition oi Ong Ka Thai taken
in a separate action, and transcribed in
1991 at request of Defendants - expedited
rate

363.00

b. Deponents not called to testify
trial by either side (M. Stevens,
Foote, C. Despain, and C. Bennett)

482.20

at
C.

c. Fact witnesses at trial called by
Plaintiffs (D. Alldredge, Ong Ka Thai, J.
Cummings, and J. Stevens)

1,210.50

d. Experts called at trial by Plaintiffs
(Newlon, Milne, Stiff, Lang and Caldwell)

936.55

Total of Items a. through d. above
$ 2,992.25

10861

-1 -
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5.

6.

Reporter fees for depositions of 14
people deposed by Plaintiffs but who
never testified at trial and whose
depositions were not used at trial (S.
Anderson, E. Andrus, H. Arneson, D.
Brockbank, D.J, Cook, K. Ekker, L.
Godfrey, Maxine Hanks, R.
Ith, E.
Kimball, B. Pack, S. Snarr, D. Strong,
and C. Waltz)

$ 3,480.35

Reporter fees for depositions of 8 people
deposed by Plaintiffs, called to testify
at trial only by Defendants
a. Defendants'
Experts
(Schroeder,
Reaveley, Wilcoxen, and Funk)

913.30

b. Fact Witnesses (S. Stewart, B. Evans,
A. Landvatter, and V. Kovalenko)

866.35

Total of items a. and b. above
7.

Reporter fees for depositions of 8 people
deposed by Plaintiffs and called to
testify at trial by Plaintiffs
a. Interviewed
by Plaintiffs
before
deposition (R. Evans, S. Lenois, and S.
Nielson)
b. Depositions noticed before Plaintiffs
served first set of interrogatories on
Defendants (A. Fluckiger, R. Ord, K.
Garner, and Marion Hanks)
c.

8.

$ 1,779.65

Remaining witness (D. Lucero)

921.95

1,914.85
227.05

Total of items a. through c. above

$ 3,063.85

Grand Total of Items 1-7 above

$11,588.60

02302
10861
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ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. (0557)
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ONG INTERNATIONAL (U.S.A.)
INC, a Nevada corporation;
D&D MANAGEMENT, a Utah
corporation; and DAVID L.
ALLDREDGE, an individual,

ORDER AND
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
11th AVENUE CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation, f/k/a
SALT LAKE MEMORIAL MAUSOLEUM;
KEITH E. GARNER, an
individual;

Civil No. 900904288CN
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
The Motion of Defendants for Taxation by the Court of Costs
came on regularly for determination on December 23, 1991.

After

considering the Motion, Plaintiffs1 Verified Memorandum of Costs,
the memoranda of the parties filed in support and in opposition
to the Motion, and being fully advised in the premises, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
1. Defendants1 motion for taxation of costs be and the same
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

is hereby granted.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

2.

Witness fees for the scheduled trial date in May, 1991,

be and the same are hereby disallowed as costs of this action.
3.

Travel expenses for depositions, together with expenses

for photocopies, photograph fees and exhibits be and the same are
hereby disallowed as costs of this action.
4.

All other costs as prayed for in Plaintiffs1 Verified

Memorandum of Costs (except the $85.00 erroneous deposition fee)
be and the same are hereby allowed and taxed as costs of the
action, detailed as follows:
Filing Fees
Witness Fees
Deposition Fees
TOTAL

$

125.00
631.75
11,503.60

$12,260.35

Pursuant to the foregoing, JUDGMENT be and the same is
hereby

awarded against 11th Avenue Corporation

and Keith E.

Garner, jointly and severally, and in favor of Ong International
(U.S.A.), Inc. in the amount of Twelve Thousand Two Hundred Sixty
Dollars and Thirty-Five Cents ($12,260.35).
DATED this

j / ^ d a y of

JQ|\^

, 199^.

BY THE COURT:
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

}\U**\

• (/isvdua&ofi

ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.
CLARK W. SESSIONS
DEAN C. ANDREASEN
Attorneys for Ong International
(U.S.A.), Inc.

NIELSEN & SENIOR

}\^L
IUR H. NIELSEN^
A. WESTON
JOHN K. MANGUM
Attorneys for Defendants

210409G.OR4

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Addendum L

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CHAPTER 18
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
Section
78-18-1.

Basis for punitive damages
awards — Section inapplicable
to DUI cases — Division of
award with state.

Section
78-18-2.

Drug exception.

78-18-1- Basis for punitive damages awards — Section inapplicable to DUI cases — Division of award with
stateCD (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of
the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of
Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising
out of the tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or combination of alcohol and
drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44.
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 regarding shoplifting is not subject to the prior award of compensatory or general damages under Subsection (l)(a) whether or not restitution has been
paid to the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action under Section
78-11-15 or 78-11-16.
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible
only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made.
(3) In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50% of
the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment
of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for deposit into
the General Fund.
History: C. 1953, 78-18-1, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 237, § 1; 1991, ch. 6, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, made a stylistic
change in Subsection (1Kb) and added Subsection (lXc).

Applicability. — Laws 1989, ch. 237, § 4
provides that the act applies to all claims for
punitive damages that arise on or after May 1,
1989.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 237, § 4
makes the act effective on May 1, 1989.
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AN ACT RELATING TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES; PROVIDING CERTAIN STANDARDS
FOR AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
ENACTS:
78-18-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953
78-18-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. S e c t i o n Enacted.
Section 7 8 - 1 8 - 1 , Utah Code Annotated 1953, is
enacted to read:
78-18-1. Basis for punitive d a m a g e s a w a r d s
— S e c t i o n inapplicable to DUI c a s e s — Division of a w a r d w i t h state.
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute,
punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the
acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of
willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and
reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the
rights of others.
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and
standards of conduct of Subsection (a) do not apply
tojtny claim for punitive damages arising out of the
tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily intoxicated or under the influence of any
jgug or combination of alcohol and drugs as prohibjtejTby Section 41-6-44T

awarded and paid, 50% of the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the
state treasurer for deposit into the General Fund.
S e c t i o n 2. Section Enacted.
Section 78-18-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is
enacted to read:
78-18-2. Drug exception.
(1) Punitive damages may not be awarded if a
drug causing the claimants harm: (a) received premarket approval or licensure by the Federal Food
and Drug Administration under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. Section 301 et.
seq. or the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 201 et. seq.;
(b) is generally recognized as safe and effective
under conditions established by the Federal Food
and Drug Administration and applicable regulations, including packaging and labeling regulations.
(2) This limitation on liability for punitive damages does not apply if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the drug manufacturer knowingly withheld or misrepresented information required to be submitted to the Federal Food and Drug
Administration under its regulations, which information was material and relevant to the claimant's
harm.
S e c t i o n 3. Severability Clause.
If any provision of this act, or the application of
any provision to any person or circumstance, is held
invalid, the remainder of this act is given effect
without the invalid provision or application.
S e c t i o n 4. Effective Date.

(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condig n shall be admissible only after a finding of liabiljtyjbr punitive damages has been made.

This act takes effect on May 1,1989, and applies to
all claims for punitive damages that arise on or after
that date.

(3Hn any judgment where punitive damages are
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